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INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CORRECTING
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: THE SCOTTISH
CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION
Lissa Griffin*
INTRODUCTION
Not surprisingly, the problem of wrongful convictions has become a global
one.1 Of the many dimensions of the problem, one of the issues in the international
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author wishes to thank the fol-
lowing individuals: in Scotland, the staff of the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission,
in particular Mr. Gerald Sinclair, LLB (Hons) Dip L.P., N.P., Executive and Principal Solicitor,
and Daniel Fenn LLB (Hons) Dip L.P., N.P, Senior Legal Officer; Dr. Fiona Leverick, Senior
Lecturer in Criminal Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland. At Pace University
School of Law: Anthony DiPietro, Class of 2013, for his excellent research support; Vicki
Gannon, Senior Research Librarian; and Iris Mercado, Administrative Assistant.
1 See, e.g., Justin O. Brooks, Redinocente Hosts First Latin American Innocence Confer-
ence, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS BLOG (July 14, 2012), http://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/2012
/07/14/redinocente-hosts-first-latin-american-innocence-conference/ (“This past week lawyers,
activists, and law professors from throughout Latin America gathered in Santiago, Chile for
the First Latin American Innocence Conference. The conference was hosted by Redinocente
(http://www.redinocente.org), an organization launched this year with the mission of assist-
ing in the creation and support of innocence efforts throughout Latin America.”); Gordon
Darroch, Peter van Koppen on Miscarriages of Justice: ‘Dutch Judges Need to Be More
Critical,’ AMSTERDAM HERALD (June 9, 2012), http://amsterdamherald.com/index.php/allneuos
-list/346-20120609-courts-lucia-de-berk-breda-six -schiedam-stabbing-netherlands (“Until a
few years ago the phrase ‘miscarriage of justice’ was rarely heard in the Netherlands. But a hand-
ful of high-profile cases have put the country’s justice system under the spotlight and raised
questions about how its judges should be judged.” (emphasis omitted)); From the Wrongful
Convictions Blog: International Innocence Round-up, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 27, 2012,
1:45 PM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/Blog-Search.php (type “Filipino academics”
in the search bar and view the first entry) (“Filipino academics and activists launched a
‘Philippines Innocence Project’ last week, the first such project in the country.”); Mischa
Wilmers, Experts Ask ‘Who Is Responsible for Miscarriages of Justice?’, THE GUARDIAN
(July 6, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/the-northerner/2012/jul/06/manchester
-justice-miscarriage?INTCMP=SRCH (“[A]n impressive panel of experts, lawyers and jour-
nalists at Manchester’s BPP law school, to take part in a public debate aimed at reigniting
an interest in the failings of our criminal justice system.”); see also D. Michael Risinger,
Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 778–80 (2007) (estimating that 3.3% to 5.0% of defendants
convicted in capital rape-murder trials between 1982 and 1989 were innocent); Richard A.
Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42
CONN. L. REV. 435, 440 (2009) (“Each year, thousands of men and women in the United
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discussion is the role of innocence commissions.2 In 1997, the United Kingdom
created the first such commission, the U.K. Criminal Cases Review Commission
(CCRC).3 This independent body has the power to investigate and refer claims of
miscarriage of justice to the U.K. Court of Appeal.4 Norway has a similar body.5
While several U.S. states have study-and-report commissions,6 the only similar, that
States are wrongfully convicted of felonies that they did not commit.”); Ken Armstrong &
Steve Mills, Part 1: Death Row Justice Derailed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, http://articles
.chicagotribune.com/1999-11-14/news/chi-991114deathillinois1_1_capital-punishment
-death-row-criminal-justice-system (beginning of a five-part series on faulty justice in Illinois
capital cases from 1977 to 1999); Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov.
1999, at 66, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/99nov/9911wrongman
.htm (reporting on the “horrifyingly likely” prospect that “innocent people will be executed
in America”); Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, available
at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations
.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (“There have been 303 post-conviction DNA exonerations
in the United States . . . . Since 1989, there have been tens of thousands of cases where prime
suspects were identified and pursued—until DNA testing (prior to conviction) proved that
they were wrongly accused.”).
2 For a general discussion of the defining features of innocence commissions, see Kent
Roach, The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform or Both?,
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 89 (2010) (“Innocence commissions have emerged over the last
decade as a new institution in the criminal justice system. . . . Innocence commissions have
ranged from self-appointed study commissions with an interest in systemic reform of the crim-
inal justice system to temporary or permanent state-appointed inquiries into specific cases
and/or systemic causes of wrongful convictions to permanent state-appointed commissions
with a mandate to investigate claims of miscarriages of justice and to re-open judicial pro-
ceedings in individual cases.”); see also David Kyle, Correcting Miscarriages of Justice: The
Role of the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 657, 676 (2004) (“The
most that the Commission can offer is, in one sense, another statement of the obvious—
namely, that miscarriages of justice will occur however robust the system—and the more
serious observation that mature criminal justice systems have no problem accepting this as
a reality and are therefore interested in identifying public mechanisms for redress that work
for them.”).
3 For an analysis of the CCRC, see Lissa Griffin, Correcting Injustice: Studying How
the United Kingdom and the United States Review Claims of Innocence, 41 U. TOL. L. REV.
107 (2009).
4 See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 194B (1), available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/46/contents.
5 The Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission was established January 1, 2004.
See Introduction, NORWEGIAN CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.gjenopptakelse
.no/index.php?id=163 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (“The Norwegian Criminal Cases Review
Commission is an independent body which has responsibility for deciding whether convicted
persons who seek review of their conviction/sentence should have their cases retried in court.
If the Commission decides that there should be a review, the case will be referred for retrial
before a court other than that which imposed the conviction/sentence.”).
6 Amongst those states are California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin. See Criminal Justice Reform
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is, direct review commission in the United States is the North Carolina Innocence
Inquiry Commission.7 One commission that has received virtually no international
attention is the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC),8 which was
created two years after the U.K.’s CCRC.9 Like its older sister, the SCCRC is an
independent body with the power to investigate and refer claims of miscarriage of
justice to the domestic appellate court.10 The SCCRC is the subject of this article.
It should be said at the outset that it is not an easy task to analyze and describe
the SCCRC’s work in correcting wrongful convictions. Unlike its U.K. counterpart,
the SCCRC works under strict statutory non-disclosure rules that keep much of its
work from public view.11 It is thus impossible, for example, to review cases that are
considered and investigated but not referred to the court because the SCCRC is not
permitted to disclose its statement of reasons (for referral or non-referral).12 For the
same reason, it is not possible to know the basis for a referral, because the statement
of reasons in referral cases is also confidential.13 While the basis for the referral is
Commissions: Case Studies, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content
/Criminal_Justice_Reform_Commissions_Case_Studies.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
7 The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission was established in 2006. See About
Us, NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, http://www.innocencecommission-nc
.gov/about.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (“The Commission is charged with providing an in-
dependent and balanced truth-seeking forum for credible post-conviction claims of innocence
in North Carolina. The Commission is separate from the appeals process. A person exonerated
by the Commission process is declared innocent and cannot be retried for the same crime.”).
8 The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission was established in April 1999. See
About the Commission, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc.org.uk
/aboutthecommission.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013); Role of SCCRC, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES
REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc.org.uk/role.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (“Our role
is to review and investigate cases where it is alleged that a miscarriage of justice may have
occurred in relation to conviction, sentence or both. . . . After the review has been completed, we
will decide whether or not the case should be referred to the High Court. If we decide to refer a
case, the case will be heard and determined by the High Court as if it were a normal appeal.”).
9 The CCRC was established in March 1997. See About the Criminal Cases Review
Commission (CCRC), MINISTRY JUST., http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/criminal-cases-review
-commission (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (“Our purpose is to review possible miscarriages
of justice in the criminal courts of England, Wales and Northern Ireland and refer appropriate
cases to the appeal courts.”).
10 The Commission is authorized to refer a case to the High Court when it determines:
“(a) that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred; and (b) that it is in the interests of
justice that a reference should be made.” Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46,§
194C (amended by Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997, c. 48, § 25(1)), available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/46/contents.
11 See Legislation, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc.org.uk
/legislation.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
12 See General, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc.org.uk
/accesstoinformation.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
13 Id.
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sometimes discussed in the ultimate court decision on a referred case, there have in
fact been very few referrals and even fewer written decisions. From its inception in
1999 to March 2013, the SCCRC had referred only 115 cases.14 Only fifty-one have
resulted in written decisions.15 While this may be an appropriate number of referrals,
it is a challenge to discern patterns in such a small body of cases.
For these reasons, I requested and was given permission to visit the SCCRC’s
office in Glasgow, Scotland. During that visit I was graciously given the opportu-
nity to speak at length with many members of the SCCRC staff, including its
Executive Director, Gerard Sinclair. The staff was extremely forthcoming and it
was a fascinating visit.
Ultimately, and despite these limitations, it is possible to draw some interesting
conclusions about the work of the SCCRC.16 First, the SCCRC seems willing to
refer cases to the courts based on fresh evidence (what we call “newly discovered
evidence”), when the Commission concludes that evidence is important and credible,
even if the court ultimately disagrees and holds that it is not significant enough to
require quashing the conviction. In fact, the SCCRC seems quite confident in draw-
ing its own conclusions about the credibility and significance of fresh evidence in
cases in which the court’s ultimate decision reveals this to have been a fairly debat-
able question. The same is true of the SCCRC’s willingness to refer cases demon-
strating that the Crown had improperly failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense (what we call a Brady violation).17 Faced with a case involving serious pros-
ecutorial non-disclosure, the SCCRC is likely to take a broad view of whether the
non-disclosed evidence was important to the case, even when the court ultimately
disagrees. Finally, the SCCRC takes very seriously the requirement that there be
something new in the case before it can be referred;18 consistent with the Court of
Criminal Appeal’s scope of review, the SCCRC will not refer a case in which it is
troubled by the reliability of the verdict in the absence of new evidence or a new
legal ground to do so.19 This same position has led to some substantial criticism of
the CCRC.
14 See Case Statistics, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc.org
.uk/casestatistics.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
15 See Referred Cases, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc.org
.uk/referredcases.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (refer to the “conviction” and “sentence”
sub-links in the left column to browse lists of individual cases with written decisions).
16 References to information learned in person are noted in the footnotes that follow. I
am extremely grateful for the professional, candid, and gracious opportunity I was given.
17 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
18 See Peter Duff, Straddling Two Worlds: Reflections of a Retired Criminal Cases Review
Commissioner, 72 MOD. L. REV. 693, 702 & nn.53–54 (2009).
19 According to former SCCRC member Peter Duff,
[t]he Commission was not designed to act as an agent of the defence;
rather it was intended by Parliament to operate in the public interest as
“a non-adversarial body conducting neutral enquiries”. Thus, the appro-
priate approach for us should be, in very broad terms, “inquisitorial” 
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For those interested in the role of innocence commissions as a method of
correcting wrongful convictions, these conclusions may not be surprising. What is
surprising, however, is the absence of traditional (read U.S.) causes of wrongful
convictions in the applications made to the SCCRC and referred by them, i.e., faulty
one-witness identification evidence, false testimony by jailhouse snitches and other
informants, prosecutorial non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and junk science.
Aside from prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence, the other major
causes of wrongful convictions in the United States did not make up a substantial part
of the SCCRC’s caseload. As will be discussed further, several significant aspects
of Scottish criminal procedure—including, for example, a corroboration requirement,
videotaping of confessions, and limited prosecutorial discretion for negotiation and
cooperation deals—appear to prevent the proliferation of several categories of un-
reliable verdicts as we know them in the United States.
Part I of this Article traces the history of the SCCRC and outlines the procedures
employed by the SCCRC after an application is received, with particular attention
to its extensive investigatory procedures. It also describes and analyzes the standards
for referral of an application to the Scottish court. Part II briefly sets forth the sta-
tistics concerning applications, referrals, and judicial decisions. Part III includes an
analysis of the SCCRC’s work by looking at the cases that have been referred and
decided by the court. Those cases are divided into several categories: fresh evidence
referrals, referrals based on a newly raised legal issue, and historic cases. It also in-
cludes a discussion of two sui generis, but very important decisions, and a consider-
ation of how the SCCRC and the court deal with cases that do not involve any new
factual or legal claims. Part IV reflects on and attempts to draw some conclusions
about the SCCRC’s role in the correction of wrongful convictions.
I. THE SCCRC
A. History
In April 1999, the SCCRC was established pursuant to the recommendation of
the Sutherland Committee on Appeals Criteria and Alleged Miscarriages of Justice.20
because we should carry out our own investigation independent of the
parties, namely the applicant and the Crown.
Id. at 703–04 (footnote omitted) (quoting GREAT BRITAIN HOME OFFICE, CRIMINAL APPEALS
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CRIMINAL CASE REVIEW AUTHORITY: A DISCUSSION PAPER
¶ 52 (1994)).
20 The legislation added the SCCRC into the 1995 Act. See Criminal Procedure (Scotland)
Act, 1995, c. 46, § 194A. After ten years in existence, the Commission had developed into
“more than simply a gatekeeper for the appeal court, receiving and filtering applications by
convicted persons.” SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES
REVIEW COMMISSION 10TH ANNIVERSARY RESEARCH FINAL REPORT 59 (2009), available
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The SCCRC was established two years after its English counterpart, the CCRC.21
Like its older sister, the SCCRC was given the power to refer cases to the courts;22
like its older sister, it does not have the power actually to reverse or uphold convic-
tions.23 Prior to its establishment, convicted defendants who had exhausted the ap-
peal process could apply to the U.K. Secretary of State for Scotland for review of
their conviction or sentence.24 This was the same procedure as in the United Kingdom
prior to the establishment of the CCRC.25 Once the old discretionary procedure was
replaced by commission review for U.K. applicants, there was no basis to continue
it in Scotland.26
The SCCRC is empowered to accept cases from individuals convicted in both
summary and solemn proceedings.27 Unlike its U.K. counterpart, however, there is
no statutory requirement that an applicant have previously appealed or exhausted the
appeals process.28 Nevertheless, this is clearly the preferred route, and most of the
at http://www.sccrc.org.uk/ViewFile.aspx?id=393. To this end, the Commission now provides
a route to fix a wide range of irregularities undermining the veracity of the Scottish judiciary.
See id. at 60–61 (“[T]he Commission’s role is again not limited to any particular category of
miscarriage of justice . . . . The Commission therefore provides an important route for the
correction of such irregularities, which would otherwise be difficult to achieve.”). For a thor-
ough analysis of the establishment of the SCCRC, see Peter Duff, Criminal Cases Review
Commissions and “Deference” to the Courts: The Evaluation of Evidence and Evidentiary
Rules, 2001 CRIM. L. REV. 341, 341–62.
21 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
22 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
23 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 20, at 9.
24 Duff, supra note 18, at 694. Applicants who are denied relief by the SCCRC, or defen-
dants that have no legal avenues available for redress, may still petition the nobile officium
of the High Court for review of their claims. See id. at 708 n.78 (“The nobile officium is an
equitable remedy of last resort where no other legal options are available to the applicant.”).
25 Duff, supra note 18, at 694.
26 Notably, the SCCRC may have the power to refer cases to the Secretary of State, for
the exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy although there is no statutory authority for doing
so, as there is in the United Kingdom. To date, it has not exercised this power. See Innocence
Projects, INNOCENCE NETWORK UNITED KINGDOM (INUK), http://www.innocencenetwork
.org.uk/inuk-protocols (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (“It is also possible that innocence projects
may make applications for a Free Pardon under the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy
in applications to the Secretary of State if strong evidence of factual innocence exists that
does not provide legal grounds for appeal in the eyes of the CCRC and/or the SCCRC.”).
27 See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 194E, ¶ 1 (amended by Crime
and Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997, c. 48, § 25(1)). Likewise, the Commission is empowered
to refer a case for review even when an application has not been directly made by the person.
See Johnston v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 30 (Scot.) (stating that the SCCRC referred
both appellants’ cases due to its own concern that there had been a miscarriage of justice and
that the appellants subsequently chose to exercise their own opportunity to appeal their cases).
28 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995 c. 46, § 194B, ¶ 1 (as amended by the Crime
and Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997, c. 48, § 25(1)) (“The Commission . . . may . . . at any
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applications that are accepted for review involve cases in which the appeals process
has been exhausted.29 Like its U.K. counterpart, the SCCRC cannot decide a case;
rather, it has the power to refer a case to the High Court of the Judiciary, which will
treat it like any other appeal.
B. Procedure—Investigation and Review
Once a case is received, the Chief Executive of the Commission conducts an
initial assessment (Stage 1: Pre-Acceptance Review) to decide whether the applica-
tion should be accepted for full review.30 He or she will then make a recommendation
time, and whether or not an appeal against such conviction or sentence has previously been
heard and determined by the High Court, refer the whole case to the High Court.”).
29 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, INFORMATION, available at http://
www.sccrc.org.uk/ViewFile.aspx?id=429 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (“In normal circum-
stances, however, we look into an applicant’s case only after he has made an unsuccessful
appeal to the High Court. . . . The applicant must have exhausted the normal appeal process,
unless there are exceptional circumstances (e.g. the applicant was prevented from appealing
because serious threats were made against him or his family, or it is only our special powers
of investigation that can uncover the evidence he needs).”).
30 How We Review a Case, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc
.org.uk/howwereviewacase.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). In 2010–11, the Commission
also implemented a pre-acceptance procedure, (Stage 1: Pre-acceptance), to afford applicants a
more detailed assessment of their claims prior to any subsequent rejection. SCOTTISH CRIMINAL
CASES REVIEW COMM’N, ANNUAL AUDIT REPORT TO THE SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW
COMMISSION AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL FOR SCOTLAND 5 (2011), available at http://www
.audit-scotland.gov.uk/docs/central/2011/fa_1011_criminal_cases_review.pdf. Although the
procedure is more time consuming, the SCCRC’s initial review of an applicant’s claims is
far more comprehensive and detailed than ever before. Id. Once the Commission receives an
application, the administration officer creates a case number and file, and checks to see if the
applicant has previously sought the Commission’s review. SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW
COMM’N, STAGE 1: PRE-ACCEPTANCE ¶ 1.1 [hereinafter SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW
COMM’N, STAGE 1: PRE-ACCEPTANCE], available at http://www.sccrc.org.uk/viewfile.aspx
?id=524 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). Thereafter, the Chief Executive is informed of the new
application, and notifies the applicant and his representative to acknowledge receipt and to
inform them of the SCCRC’s procedures. Id. In the meantime, the administration officer writes
to the Justiciary Office and/or the appropriate sheriff court to request all case papers necessary
for the Commission’s review. Id. Then, “[t]he Chief Executive allocates the case to an appro-
priate legal officer and Committee.” Id. ¶ 1.3. Chief Executive also makes an inquiry into any
conflicts of interests that the legal officer or members of the Commission may have. Id. There-
after, the Chief Executive distributes duties to the legal officers for the case’s review, and in-
forms all parties of a meeting to be conducted by the Commission a month thereafter. Id. In
anticipation of the review meeting, the legal officer drafts the “Stage 1 report,” in which he
provides full details of the applicant’s conviction and sentence and grounds of review. Id. If
necessary, the legal officer may take steps to obtain any further information that may be nec-
essary so that the Committee can make a decision about whether to accept the case for review.
Id. To that end, the Commission also takes into consideration the legal officer’s recommen-
dation as to whether the case should be accepted for review or rejected. Id. At the Stage 1
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to the board and the board will agree or disagree whether a full review of the case
should be undertaken by the Commission.31
The SCCRC has broad powers to investigate, and this is clearly its strength. In
fact, the SCCRC can compel evidence by what we would consider subpoena power.
Pursuant to Section 194H of the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997, in cases
in which it appears to the SCCRC that a person may have relevant information, and
the person refuses to make a statement, the SCCRC may apply to the sheriff, who
may summon that person for a statement under oath before the SCCRC.32 A person
who fails to appear after forty-eight hours may be fined or imprisoned up to twenty-
one days and a warrant of arrest may be issued for his precognition.33 Refusal to give
information or lying to the SCCRC warrants an additional fine or imprisonment.34
The SCCRC also has the same broad powers to obtain documents. When it
believes that any person or public body has documents that may assist it, it may
apply to the court for what is in essence a subpoena.35 This power applies whether
it is in relation to a case before the Commission or any other case in any way re-
lated to that case.36 It also applies regardless of other provisions requiring secrecy
or non-disclosure.37 Under this provision the SCCRC will routinely get the Crown
meeting, the Commission members determine whether the case should be accepted. Id. ¶ 1.4.
The Commission then proceeds to seek the Board’s approval of its recommendation for ref-
erral. Id. ¶ 1.5. If accepted, the case proceeds forward for a full determination. Id. Through-
out these proceedings, the applicant is informed of the decisions made by the Commission.
Id. ¶ 1.1–1.3, 1.8.
31 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, STAGE 1: PRE-ACCEPTANCE, supra
note 30, ¶ 1.5; How We Review a Case, supra note 30 (“The Committee may decide to accept
a case for review; if it does, the case proceeds to the allocation procedure and the Board will
be advised accordingly. . . . If the Committee believes at the outset that a case should be
rejected, the case will be continued to the next Board meeting for consideration and decision
by the Board. The Board may decide, notwithstanding the recommendations of the Committee,
to accept a case for review; if it does, the case will proceed to the allocation procedure.”). If
a case is accepted for full review (Stage 2) it “will be investigated by a legal officer in ac-
cordance with the Commission’s Case Handling Procedures and under the guidance of the
Chief Executive and the Board.” SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, BUSINESS
PLAN 2012–13, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.sccrc.org.uk/viewfile.aspx?id=508.
32 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 194H(1), (2) (amended by Crime
and Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997) c. 48, § 25(1)). The CCRC does not have such power.
See Griffin, supra note 3, at 113 (describing the CCRC’s Stage Two procedure).
33 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 194H(3). “Precognition” refers to
out of court questioning or deposing of witnesses.
34 Id. § 194H(4).
35 Id. § 194I(1).
36 Id. § 194I(3).
37 Id. § 194I(2). In this regard, too, the investigatory powers afforded to the SCCRC are
broader than those afforded to the CCRC, which generally can access public documents and
“seek disclosure for information that is not otherwise available to the defense.” See Griffin,
supra note 3, at 112; see also Coubrough v. H.M. Advocate, [2010] HCJAC 32 [30] (Scot.).
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witness statements, evidence, and precognition, and may be able to secure the entire
Crown file.38
In reality, the small SCCRC staff39 really does more than just described.40 First,
they read the application,41 which is really a bare-bones document.42 Second, in
virtually every case they meet with the applicant.43 If it is not otherwise clear from
the application, they explore every possible new issue—factual or legal—to see if
38 See How We Review a Case, supra note 30 (stating that “[o]nce an application is
accepted [the Commission] will obtain papers from the Court, the police and the Crown”).
39 As of March 31, 2012, the Commission’s staff included a Chief Executive, a Director
of Corporate Services, two Senior Legal Officers, seven Legal Officers (one current vacancy),
and three Administration Staff. SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT
2011–12, at 8, (2012), available at http://www.sccrc.org.uk/viewfile.aspx?id=551.
40 Regarding the depth and efficiency of the SCCRC’s workload, Jean Couper, SCCRC
Chairman helped explain
[t]his is the first full year of the Commission’s stage 1 pre-acceptance
procedure which provides a more detailed assessment upon which to
either accept or reject a case for full review. This procedure requires con-
siderably more work for each application received but has led to a re-
duction in the percentage of cases accepted for full review, falling from
a relatively static 66% in 2010–11 to 37% in 2011–12. It is also inter-
esting to note that the referral rate of cases to the High Court following
full review has increased from 2.8% in 2010–11 to 3.8% in 2011–12.
SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 39, at 3; see also SCOTTISH CRIMINAL
CASES REVIEW COMM’N, STATE 1: PRE-ACCEPTANCE, supra note 30.
41 Duff, supra note 18, at 694 (“[U]nlike in England, every application—whether it leads
to a referral to the appeal court or a refusal—was, and still is, determined by a full Board, ie
[sic] at a meeting attended by all of the Commissioners.”).
42 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, APPLICATION FORM FOR REVIEW
OF CONVICTION OR SENTENCE OR BOTH, available at http://www.sccrc.org.uk/ViewFile.aspx?id
=408 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). In this regard, the Commission had envisioned that the pre-
acceptance review (Stage 1) would provide procedural change that would promote “unwar-
ranted applications being rejected at the outset; poorly presented applications with merit being
more likely to be identified and accepted; and a reduction in the review timescales for both
sentence-only and conviction reviews following acceptance.” SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES
REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 39, at 24.
43 The Commission’s staff will generally try to meet with applicants in person at least
once during the review process. See Frequently Asked Questions, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV.
COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc.org.uk/frequentlyaskedquestions.aspx (last visited Apr. 16,
2013). Nevertheless, the Commission can decide that meeting with the applicant is unneces-
sary. See What We Can Do, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc.org
.uk/whatwecando.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (“We can choose not to interview wit-
nesses that the applicant wishes to be interviewed if we feel that it is unnecessary. We can
choose not to investigate grounds of review raised by an applicant if we are of the view that
the grounds are unsubstantiated. We can refuse to accept an application for review where an
applicant submits a second application or further applications after having had a full review
conducted, where no new issues are raised.”).
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there is a basis for continuing to investigate.44 They review all of the documents.
What they are looking for is something new: some issue or fact that was not part of
the prior adjudication process. So, for example, if an applicant simply claims he is
innocent, the staff will explore possible legal issues that might explain why the jury
convicted or potential sources of new facts that might establish that the conviction
is a miscarriage of justice.45
Once an application is accepted the SCCRC will gather the relevant police and
Crown documents and write all relevant parties informing them that the case has
been accepted for review and that all documents must be preserved.46 The case is
then given to a legal officer and a Committee.47 The legal officer reviews the case
and prepares a case plan document setting forth the Crown and defense case at trial,
the appeal, the grounds for review, and recommendations as to review and further
investigation.48 This is submitted to the Committee of two or three Board Members
and the Chief Executive, who, along with the Legal Officer, decide how to proceed.49
Once the Chief Executive and Legal Officer complete the review, the Committee
decides whether to refer the case.50 The Legal Officer then prepares a statement of
reasons for the Committee’s action.51 Once the Committee is content with the draft
statement, the Legal Officer will present it and the case to the Board with the Com-
mittee members available to answer questions.52 The Board will then decide whether
to refer the case.53
If the Board decides not to refer the case, the applicant has twenty-one days in
which to submit any further materials to the Commission.54 This period may be
44 During 2011–12, the SCCRC’s average review time for an application increased mar-
ginally to 3.9 from 3.7 months in respect of sentence-only and reduced from 8.6 to 8.0 months
in respect of conviction. Only one (0.7%) of the Commission’s cases exceeded the twelve-month
target whereby [the SCCRC] aimed to complete 98% of cases received before March 31, 2011,
within this period. SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 4.
45 Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission v. H.M. Advocate, (2001) J.C. 36, ¶ 9
(Scot.) (“Parliament intended the petitioners to have the fullest investigative powers in reach-
ing the decision whether or not a reference to the court should be made in any particular case
and that in exercising these powers, in the performance of their investigative duties, they are
to act independently and to be seen to act independently. There can be no question . . . of
their powers of investigation being directed or circumscribed by any other person or body.”).
46 How We Review a Case, supra note 30.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 The Decision Process, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc
.org.uk/thedecisionprocess.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
54 Id.
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extended liberally.55 If nothing is submitted, the decision is final.56 If further repre-
sentations are submitted they will be considered by the Board.57 If the board continues
in the position that there should be no referral, the decision will become final.58
The decision not to review may be appealed to the court.59 This is in the nature
of mandamus. A second or even third application may be made to the SCCRC,60 but
if no new issues are raised, review likely will be denied.
C. Power to Refer
The SCCRC may refer any case in which it concludes “(a) that a miscarriage of
justice may have occurred; and (b) that it is in the interests of justice that a reference
should be made.”61 A decision to refer or not to refer must be accompanied by a
statement of reasons; if the case is not referred the statement is issued to the appli-
cant and the parties’ representatives; if the case is referred, the statement is also
provided to the High Court and all potential parties or their representatives.62 In
neither case may the statement of reasons be made public.63
The first prong of the referral standard—finding a miscarriage of justice—is the
sole ground of appeal in Scotland,64 so to that extent the first part of the SCCRC’s
mandate—to refer a case where a miscarriage of justice “may” have occurred—
reflects traditional appellate standards. Under this statutory standard, of course, the
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Appealing our Decision, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.sccrc
.org.uk/appealingourdecision.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
60 Id.
61 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 194C (amended by Crime and
Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997, c. 48, § 25(1)). Under Section 194B of the Criminal
Procedure Act, any conviction or sentence passed on a person convicted on indictment or
complaint can be referred to the High Court by the Commission irrespective of whether or
not an appeal against the conviction or sentence has been heard and determined by the High
Court. Id. § 194B(1).
62 Id. §§ 194D (4), (5).
63 General, supra note 12; see also Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, c.46 §§ 194J,
194K, 194L.
64 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, §§ 106(3) (solemn procedure), 175(5)
(summary procedure) (as amended by Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997, c. 48,
§17(2)). Expressing the need for the Commission’s recognition of customary restraint in its
referral process, Lord Emslie stressed that the Commission was obliged to apply the “correct
legal test” in making a decision whether to refer a case to the appeal court. In the Petitions
of BM, KK, and DP, [2006] CSOH 112 [43] (Scot.). To this end, Lord Emslie was impliedly
critical of the claim that the Commission was not required to “second-guess” the appeal
court. Id. ¶ 40.
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SCCRC may not refer a case that has no chance of being quashed on appeal.
However, as discussed above, unlike its U.K. sister, the SCCRC has no explicit
obligation to refer only cases where it concludes that there is a “real possibility” that
the appellate court will agree that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.65 Indeed, the
SCCRC need only find that “a miscarriage of justice may have occurred” to refer a
case,66 while the court, to quash a case, must find that a miscarriage of justice did,
in fact occur.67 Moreover, the proviso that the SCCRC find not only that a miscar-
riage of justice may have occurred but also that it is in the interest of justice to refer
gives the SCCRC even more discretionary power to refer a case, regardless of how
it thinks the court of appeal would decide it.68 As of October 2010, the High Court
has a new power to reject a referral from the Commission if it considers that it is not
in the interests of justice that an appeal proceeds forward.69 As of the end of the year
2011, this power had not been exercised, and a recent report recommended that this
right of refusal should be repealed.70
65 Id. ¶¶ 13, 23. See, e.g., Coubrough v. H.M. Advocate, [2010] HCJAC 32 [30] (Scot.)
(“Unlike the English test of whether a conviction is unsafe, the Scottish test of miscarriage
of justice permits the court to consider broader issues such as the public interest and the
desirability of certainty and finality in the criminal justice system.”). The issue of deference
to the appellate courts has been subject to intense debate. See, e.g., P.W. Ferguson, Letter to
the Editor, 2001 CRIM. L. REV., 761–62; see also Peter Duff, Reply to P.W. Ferguson, 2001
CRIM. L. REV. 762–63.
66 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46,§ 194C(1)(a).
67 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 20, at 12.
68 Id. at 10.
69 See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 48, § 194DA. The statute reads:
(1) Where the Commission has referred a case to the High Court under
section 194B of this Act, the High Court may, despite section 194B(1),
reject the reference if the Court considers that it is not in the interests
of justice that any appeal arising from the reference should proceed.
(2) In determining whether or not it is in the interests of justice that any
appeal arising from the reference should proceed, the High Court must
have regard to the need for finality and certainty in the determination
of criminal proceedings.
(3) On rejecting a reference under this section, the High Court may make
such order as it considers necessary or appropriate.
Id.
70 See SCOTTISH GOV’T, REFORMING SCOTS CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE: THE CARLOWAY
REPORT, available at http://scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0039/00396483.pdf (last visited Apr. 16,
2013). Relevant to the SCCRC’s functioning, Lord Carloway recommended that:
[S]ection 194C(2) of the 1995 Act (as inserted by Section 7(3) of the
2010 Act) which introduces a requirement on the SCCRC to consider
“finality and certainty” in considering a reference, should be retained.
There should, however, be no further statutory listing of the criteria
included in the “interests of justice” test for SCCRC references;
section 194DA of the 1995 Act (as inserted by Section 7(4) of the 2010
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1. Whether “a Miscarriage of Justice May Have Occurred”
Pursuant to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995 Section 106(3) (as
amended by Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997 Section 17(1)), an appeal
may be brought to the High Court based on any alleged miscarriage of justice.71
While presumably a miscarriage of justice may be based on a prejudicial legal
error,72 such a miscarriage of justice may also be based on:
(a) . . . the existence and significance of evidence which was not
heard at the original proceeding [so-called “fresh evidence”]; and
(b) the jury’s having returned a verdict which no reasonable jury,
properly directed, could have returned.73
Pursuant to Section (3A), fresh evidence will not be accepted unless: 1) it is in
fact, new evidence;74 2) there is a reasonable explanation why it was not given at the
trial;75 and 3) it is of such significance that “[a] verdict returned in ignorance of it[s
existence] must be regarded as a miscarriage of justice.”76 When the reason the evi-
dence was not admitted earlier is that it was not admissible at the time but is admis-
sible at the time of the appeal, the court may admit that evidence “if it appears to the
court that it would be in the interests of justice to do so.”77 However, when the evi-
dence is from a new witness or a person who gave evidence at the original proceed-
ings that is different from, or additional to, the evidence already given, that evidence
“may not found” an appeal unless the explanation for why the evidence was not
Act) which provides a “gate-keeping role” for the Appeal Court in rela-
tion to references from the SCCRC should be repealed; and when con-
sidering appeals following upon references from the SCCRC, the test for
allowing an appeal should be that: (a) there has been a miscarriage of
justice; and (b) it is in the interests of justice that the appeal be allowed.
Id. at 53–54.
71 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 106(3).
72 See PETER DUFF & FRAZER MCCALLUM, GROUNDS OF APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES 22
Tbl. 7 (1996). For example, a sample of 250 appeals against conviction under solemn procedure
were provided, which produced 350 grounds of appeal, 147 of the grounds related to alleged
misdirection by the judge. Id. Likewise, in the sample of 350 appeal grounds, only four related
to alleged jury irregularity. Id.
73 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, § 106(3) (amended by Crime and Punishment
(Scotland) Act, 1997, c. 48, § 17(1)).
74 Id. § 106(3)(A).
75 Id. § (3A); see also McCormack v. H.M. Advocate, [2005] HCJAC 38 [8]–[9] (Scot.)
(holding that the defendant’s recovery of memory after trial may be grounds to explain earlier
absence of evidence).
76 Gilmour v. H.M. Advocate, [2007] HCJAC 48 [75] (Scot.).
77 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 106(3B) (amended by § 17 of the
Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997, c. 48, § 17(1)).
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given earlier “is itself supported by independent evidence.”78 “Independent evidence”
in this context means evidence not heard at the original proceedings and from a
source different from the person offering it, that is “accepted by the court as being
credible and reliable.”79
2. Whether It “Is in the Interest of Justice to Refer a Case”
The SCCRC has broad discretion to determine whether it is in the interests of
justice to refer a case, even when there may have been a miscarriage of justice. A
single statutory directive states: “In determining whether or not it is in the interests
of justice that a reference should be made, the Commission must have regard to the
need for finality and certainty in the determination of criminal proceedings.”80 In
practice, the kinds of factors that might militate against referral in the interests of
justice might include the age of the case, whether the applicant has died, evidence
that the applicant is in fact guilty (whether admissible or not), or the applicant’s
sentence having been served.81
II. STATISTICS: APPLICATIONS, REFERRALS, AND DECISIONS
As of March 31, 2012, 1493 cases had been received and 1436 concluded.82
Eighty-one percent were from solemn proceedings (more serious charges) and
nineteen percent from summary proceedings (less serious charges).83 Seventy-nine
percent involved review of convictions and twenty-one percent involved review of
sentence only.84
78 Id. § 106(3C).
79 Id. § 106(3D); see also Kidd v. H.M. Advocate, [2005] HCJAC 13 [23]–[24] (Scot.);
McCormack v. H.M. Advocate, [2005] HCJAC 38 [9] (Scot.) (noting the Crown’s argument
that although fresh evidence can arise where the defendant had suffered amnesia after the
crime and that evidence only became available following his recovery, such evidence must
still be credible and reliable).
80 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 194C(2) (as amended by Crime and
Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997, c. 48, § 17(1)).
81 See, e.g., Cochrane v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 27 [3], (2006) J.C. 135 (Scot.)
(refusing to refer a case in which the defendant was convicted of a charge that did not consti-
tute a statutory crime, but he was clearly guilty); Duff, supra note 20, at 362 (suggesting that
a commission is neither restrained from undertaking an independent review of the evidence
set before it or acting “outwith and independent of the criminal justice process, not as further
rungs on the ladder of the formal legal process”); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1160 (3d ed. 2000) (“Courts are naturally skeptical of claims that a defendant,
fairly convicted, with proper representation by counsel, should now be given a second oppor-
tunity because of new information that has suddenly been acquired.”).
82 SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 39, at 9, 15.
83 Id. at 10 tbl. 2.
84 Id. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the main grounds of referral in sentence-
only cases were: improper punishment part calculation (48%); sentence inconsistent with
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The largest group of applications involved defendants convicted of murder,
which accounted for 20.96%.85 The next largest group, sexual offenses other than
rape, was 15.70%.86 Rape convictions amounted to 12.12%, which makes the com-
bination of sexual offenses 27.82% of the total.87
The main ground for referral88 was evidence not heard in the original proceeding
(36%),89 followed by insufficient evidence (16%), failure to disclose (16%), defective
representation (14%), other irregular proceedings (8%), misdirection on evidence
(omission, value, weight) (9%), wrongful admission of evidence (6%), misdirection
on law (corroboration) (5%), other misdirection on law (5%), unreasonable verdict
(5%), wrongful exclusion of evidence (3%), conduct of judge (3%), conduct of jury
(3%), miscellaneous errors in law (3%), conduct of prosecutor (2%), refusal of no
case to answer submission (3%), and lurking doubt (2%).90 If one combines all
categories of cases that together challenge the reliability of the verdict of guilt, then
57% of referrals involved a challenge to the substantive finding of guilt.
As of March 31, 2012, of the 1436 applications the SCCRC had completed, it
had referred 107 cases,91 for a 7.5% referral rate.92 Ninety of the 107 cases had been
decided.93 The overall rate of referral for convictions was 5.6% (63 of 1135 convic-
tion cases).94 In fifty-eight of the ninety decided cases, the appeal had been granted
and the conviction quashed; in thirty-two cases the appeal had been refused.95 This
precedent (23%); incompetent sentence (23%); sentence calculated on an inaccurate factual
basis (2%); and inappropriate weighting of certain factors (4%). Id. at 14 tbl. 6.
85 Id. at 11 tbl. 3.
86 Id.
87 Id. Other applicants sought the SCCRC’s review for convictions relating to drug offenses
(9.18%); assault offenses (14.73% combined); other statutory offenses (5.83%); breach of the
peace (4.69%); attempted murder (4.42%); road traffic offenses (3.35%); other crimes of dis-
honesty (2.41%); robbery (2.21%); theft (1.88%); culpable homicide (1.61%); and all other
offenses (1.21%). Id.
88 Id. at 12 tbl. 4. To the contrary, the comprised percentages relating to the main grounds
for review set forth by applicants were: defective representation (17.82%); excessive sentence
(14.20%); unfair trial (10.98%); credibility or reliability of evidence (9.58%); new evidence
(8.17%); misdirection by trial judge (4.89%); Cadder (v. H.M. Advcoate) violations (3.62%);
wrong sentence imposed (3.35%); credibility or reliability of witness (3.01%); wrongful con-
viction (2.34%); police misconduct/wrong procedure (2.41%); perjury (1.74%); and all other
reasons (18.75%). Id.
89 Id. at 13 tbl. 5; SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 20, at 60
(“Although fresh evidence is a ground of referral (not necessarily the sole ground) in half of
all cases referred to the appeal court by the Commission, referred cases encompass a broad
range of grounds of appeal.”).
90 SCOTTISH CASES REVIEW COMM’N; supra note 39, at 13 tbl. 5.
91 Id. at 15.
92 Id.
93 See Id.
94 Id. The referral rate for convictions during 2011–12 was only 3.8%. Id. In 2010, the
overall referral rate was a mere 2.8%. Id. at 3.
95 See generally id.
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represents an overall success rate of 64%. Eleven appeals were abandoned following
referral.96 Omitting these abandoned cases, of the cases decided the success rate is
76%. The average time from referral to judgment was 21.7 months.97
III. THE CASES
Examination of the referred cases shows, first, that the SCCRC will not take a
case if there is nothing new, that is, new evidence that was not presented in the
process before or a legal issue that has not been raised before. These are the two
broadest categories by which to analyze the referred cases and how the SCCRC
carries out its statutory mandate.98
A. “Fresh Evidence” Referrals
To date, 36% of the referred cases (twenty-three cases) involved a review of
evidence that had not been presented at the original proceedings.99 Sixteen of those
cases resulted in written decisions. Of those sixteen cases, six were successful and
ten were not.100
While there has been much discussion about the various prerequisites for the
admission of fresh evidence on appeal,101 almost none of the fresh evidence cases
actually focuses on the admissibility question. In fact, in many cases, the Crown
conceded the admissibility of the fresh evidence.102 Instead, the court almost always
96 Id. at 15.
97 Id. From 2011 to 2012, the average time from referral to judgment increased 0.4
months. Id.
98 The Commission is authorized to refer a case to the High Court if it determined: “(a)
that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred; and (b) that it is in the interests of justice
that a reference should be made.” Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 194C(1)
(amended by § 25 of Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act, 1997, c.48, § 25(1)).
99 SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 39, at 13 tbl. 5.
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., Neeson v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 68 [6] (Scot.); In re Kelly, (2004)
App. No. XC458/03, ¶ 20 (Scot.).
102 See e.g., Gair v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 52 [13] (Scot.) (“In the appeal the
Crown conceded that P’s statements should have been disclosed but submitted that the failure
to disclose them had not led to a miscarriage of justice . . . .”); Allison v. H.M. Advocate,
[2006] HCJAC 30 [103] (Scot.) (“The Crown concedes that there is a reasonable explanation
why it was not given at the trial. The question is whether it is of such significance that we
may reasonably conclude that a verdict returned in ignorance of its existence ‘must’ be re-
garded as a miscarriage of justice.” (citations omitted) (citing Criminal Procedure (Scotland)
Act, c. 48, §§ 106(3)(a)(3A), Cameron v. H.M. Advocate, (1987) S.C.C.R. 608(Scot.))); Kidd
v. H.M. Advocate, [2005] HCJAC 13 [19] (Scot.) (“While the Crown had conceded that the
statements which Pamela Carlyle had made to the police should have been disclosed to the
defence, the court would still have to be satisfied that the failure to disclose the statements
had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”); see also McCormack v. H.M. Advocate, [2005]
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focuses on the last step in a referral based on fresh evidence—whether such evi-
dence is of such significance that a “verdict . . . , reached in ignorance of its existence,
must be regarded as a miscarriage of justice.”103
Several standards exist for the court in evaluating the significance of fresh evi-
dence. First, the court will quash a conviction based on fresh evidence if it is “satisfied
that the original jury, if it had heard the new evidence, would have been bound to
acquit.”104 This is obviously an extremely high standard and has rarely been met.105
But, where that standard is not met, the court may nevertheless quash a convic-
tion where it finds that the fresh evidence is credible and also “of such significance
that it [would be] reasonable to conclude that the verdict of the jury, which was
reached in ignorance of its existence, must be regarded as a miscarriage of justice.”106
That is, the court must be satisfied that the fresh evidence “is important . . . and of
such a kind and quality that it was likely that a reasonable jury properly directed
would have found it of material assistance in its consideration of a critical issue at
the trial.”107 To reach this conclusion the evidence must be (a) “capable of being
regarded as credible and reliable by a reasonable jury, and (b) likely to have had a
material bearing on, or a material part to play in, the determination by such a jury
of a critical issue at the trial.”108
Analysis and comparison of the successful and unsuccessful appeals clearly
reveals two things about the fresh evidence cases: the SCCRC has erred on the side
of referral where the significance of the fresh evidence presents a close question,
and, in those referrals, the court has been quite conservative about quashing a
conviction based on fresh evidence.
HCJAC 38 [9] (Scot.) (“The Crown concedes . . . that the preconditions of section 106 are
made out. But it contends that the appellant’s recovered recollections are neither credible nor
reliable, and that in any event his new evidence, if accepted, could not justify a conviction
of culpable homicide on the basis of provocation.”).
103 See Casey v. H.M. Advocate, [2011] HCJAC 19 [46] (Scot.) (considering whether fresh
evidence, in the form of DNA evidence, “would have been of such significance that it would
be reasonable to conclude that the verdict of the jury, reached in ignorance of its existence,
must be regarded as a miscarriage of justice.”).
104 Uttley v. H.M. Advocate, [2009] HCJAC 95 [26] (Scot.) (quoting Al-Megrahi v. H.M.
Advocate, (2002) J.C. 99 [219] (Scot.)).
105 See Johnston v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 30 (Scot.); Kidd, HCJAC 13; Al-
Megrahi, J.C. 99; Higgins v. H.M. Advocate, (1956) J.C. 69, 83 (Scot.) (holding that addi-
tional evidence must have been sufficient to produce a different verdict had it been given at
the trial); cf. Gallacher v. H.M. Advocate, (1951) J.C. 38, 48 (Scot.) (holding that additional
evidence was not material because it would not have produced a different verdict).
106 See In re Kelly, App. No. XC458/03, ¶ 20 (stating that new evidence must not only be
relevant, but “of such a kind and quality that it was likely that a reasonable jury properly
directed would have found it to be of material assistance in its consideration of a critical
issue at the trial”).
107 Id.
108 Id. (citing Al-Megrahi, J.C. 99, ¶ 219).
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As noted above, only sixteen decisions on referred cases have involved fresh
evidence. Nevertheless, it is possible to break these down into two main categories:
those involving fresh evidence 1) bearing on the credibility of the trial witnesses;
and 2) based on new scientific procedures.109
B. Fresh Evidence Bearing on Credibility
The more complex set of fresh evidence cases involves fresh evidence that is
offered to impeach the trial proof. These cases are more complex for several reasons.
First, they present serious questions about why the evidence was not produced at
trial.110 Second, their credibility and reliability is often seriously in issue, particularly
when the same witness has testified differently at different times.111 Third, the court
is substantially less likely to second-guess a jury verdict that was properly based on
the testimony before it.112 New scientific evidence that was concededly not available
at the time of trial due to the state of science at the time is clearly an easier basis on
which to second-guess a jury.
Nevertheless, in an extreme case, the court has been willing to quash when new
evidence demonstrates that an essential or central trial witness can no longer be
considered credible. A good example is Gair v. H.M. Advocate.113 Gair was accused
of murder based largely on the identification evidence of one Morrison.114 While
there were other eyewitnesses who identified him, Morrison’s testimony was the
strongest.115 The Commission produced fresh evidence of Morrison’s prior contra-
dictory statements that revealed he was subject to “fantasy” and was prepared to tell
lies and change his story when it suited him.116 It also produced evidence that he had
109 See, e.g., Coubrough v. H.M. Advocate, [2010] HCJAC 32 [2] (Scot.) (addressing fresh
evidence founded upon memory expert opinion); Gordon v. H.M. Advocate, [2010] HCJAC
44 [46] (Scot.) (addressing fresh witness evidence); In re Steele, (2004) App. No. XC956/03,
¶ 51 (Scot.) (addressing fresh evidence founded upon psychological studies).
110 See, e.g., Gair v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 52 [9] (Scot.) (“[E]vidence would be
relied on to support the explanation why these witnesses did not give the evidence at trial that
they now wish to give.”).
111 See, e.g., id. ¶ 11 (“[P]revious statements to the police given by witnesses . . . were at
variance with the evidence that they gave at the trial relating to their identification of the
appellant.”).
112 See, e.g., id. ¶ 13.
113 [2006] HCJAC 52 (Scot.).
114 Id. ¶ 39.
115 Id.
116 See id. ¶ 17. It was revealed by the Commission’s investigation that Morrison had given
four divergent statements to police when interviewed. Id. In his third statement, Morrison
admitted his prior statements to police were false, and his identification of the defendant was
unsound and motivated by his personal interests. Id. ¶ 19 (“I have come up here to sort out
the matter and I have to tell you that a lot of what I have already told the police is not the
truth . . . . I said it was [the defendant] because of all the trouble he has caused me and I
knew he always did the poofs up at the toilets.”).
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been in a psychiatric hospital.117 This new evidence presented powerful, reliable im-
peachment of a key witness. In quashing the conviction, the court explained:
Of course, even if the jury had had a fuller picture of Morrison
as revealed by this information, they might still have convicted
the appellant. One cannot tell what the effect of the additional
information would have been. Morrison was not an essential wit-
ness for the Crown. But he was a very important one and the fact
that his evidence and, particularly his identification evidence,
interrelated with the evidence of the other eye-witnesses was a
point which the Advocate depute [the prosecutor] at trial quite
naturally founded upon in his closing speech to the jury. Without
Morrison’s evidence that point could not have been made, or at
least could not have been made so cogently. In our view, there-
fore, the Advocate depute before us was not correct in saying
that the best that the defense could hope for if they had had the
non-disclosed information about Morrison was the destruction
of him as a witness. It is not possible to say that without his evi-
dence the jury would nevertheless have convicted. . . . So the pos-
sibility that the jury might have reached a different verdict if the
police statements and other information about Morrison had been
disclosed is in our view real and certainly cannot be excluded.118
Short of this kind of powerful impeachment, and despite the SCCRC’s belief
that such fresh evidence is credible, the court has not been willing to quash based
on fresh credibility evidence unless the case also presents 1) some sort of government
misconduct; or 2) an accompanying new legal issue.119 McPhee v. H.M. Advocate120
and Neeson v. H.M. Advocate121 demonstrate this reluctance. Both cases involved
fresh evidence impeaching the credibility of the Crown’s main trial witness who, in
both cases, claimed the defendant had confessed to him.122 Both cases involved
convictions for murder.123 In McPhee, the applicant was successful and his convic-
tion was quashed.124 In Neeson, the applicant was unsuccessful.125
117 Id. ¶¶ 21, 29, 38, 40.
118 Id. ¶ 39.
119 See, e.g., McPhee v. H.M. Advocate, [2005] HCJAC 137 [39] (Scot.) (government
misconduct); Neeson v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 68 [23]–[24] (Scot.) (new legal issue).
120 [2005] HCJAC 137 (Scot.).
121 [2006] HCJAC 68 [6] (Scot.).
122 McPhee, HCJAC 137 [24]; Neeson, HCJAC 68 [16].
123 McPhee, HCJAC 137 [1]; Neeson, HCJAC 68 [1].
124 McPhee, HCJAC 137 [5], [40].
125 Neeson, HCJAC 68 [24].
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In McPhee, the defendant had interposed a defense of alibi.126 However, after
the trial testimony of one Hawkins—who testified he went into the victim’s home
with the defendant but that defendant was the killer—the defendant changed his
defense and accused Hawkins of committing the crime.127 After that, McPhee’s
cellmate, Trevor Proudfoot testified that when he shared a cell with the defendant,
the defendant confessed to him.128 A police officer also testified that footprints in-
side and outside the house matched the defendant’s shoes and, in addition, that the
lab test confirmed this match.129
In its referral, the Commission expressed serious concerns about the credibility
and reliability of all three pieces of the Crown case.130 As to Hawkins, it noted that
he had substantially changed his position in five statements to the police.131 The
Commission also produced fresh evidence that Proudfoot had been on drugs when
he had been arrested and had made a deal concerning pending drug trafficking
charges.132 Indeed, the Commission expressed the view “that it is arguable that
Northern Constabulary offered Mr Proudfoot inducements to give evidence and
that he was given information about the murder . . . by them.”133 The Commission
also produced forensic evidence of the unreliability of the footprint evidence of
which the police, although not the Crown, had been aware.134 This last concern led
to the Crown’s concession of the appeal.135
126 McPhee, HCJAC 137 [4].
127 Id.
128 Id. ¶ 7.
129 Id. ¶¶ 8–12. The officer in charge of the enquiry, the late Detective Superintendent (D.
Supt.) Andrew Lister, offered opinion testimony alluding to the fact that the footprints ex-
cluded Hawkins and pointed to McPhee as the maker of the footprint. Id. ¶ 18.
130 Id. ¶ 24.
131 Id.
132 Id. ¶ 24.
133 Id.
134 Id. ¶ 32–33. The Crown indicated that the prosecutor was not aware of the contents of
the letter and, if he had been, he would not have allowed the police to give the evidence he
gave. Id. A report indicating that “nothing to be gleaned from the cast in terms of size etc”
was countersigned by the police witness less than three weeks before he testified. Id. ¶ 30.
There is no evidence that the Crown had this letter in its possession. Id. The court held:
D Supt Lister’s evidence that the laboratory confirmed his view that the
footprints inside and outside the house were made by the same person
was simply untrue. His evidence as to the size of the footprint was
untrue . . . . He certainly knew of the laboratory report . . . .
The advocate depute submitted to us that . . . D Supt Lister was not
acting in bad faith. We find that difficult to accept.
Id. ¶¶ 38–39.
135 Id. ¶ 24. On this conceded point, the Commission found that evidence relating to “the
footprints . . . presented to the jury by the Crown in the absence of the available evidence
from the forensic scientists as to its unreliability resulted in unfairness to the applicant.” Id.
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The court quashed for several reasons: it was clearly distressed by the police
misconduct in the case, found Hawkins unreliable, and stated that the inducements
to Proudfoot were vital to the jury’s determination.136
Neeson was a different kind of credibility case and was not successful. In Neeson,
the defendant’s conviction rested on the testimony of Gerald Sharpe, who identified
him as one of three people to emerge from a car near the murder scene, return to the
car, and drive off at high speed.137 The second, and more significant, witness was
John Elliot, the brother of the co-accused, who testified that four days after the mur-
der the appellant confessed to him.138 The Crown case rested on the credibility and
reliability of Elliot’s testimony. At trial, the defense suggested Elliot gave false testi-
mony in return for immunity on certain charges, including drug and firearms charges.139
The fresh evidence uncovered by the SCCRC consisted of affidavits140 from three
people that purported to establish that Elliot was lying to frame the defendant.141
William Gronan asserted that he was also present when Elliot admitted setting
Neeson up and expressed his regret that he had done so.142
136 Id. Interestingly, one of the police officers involved in that case has been sentenced to
five years in prison for attempting to subvert police procedures. Another case, Allison v. H.M.
Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 30 (Scot.), demonstrates the court’s reliance on police misconduct
in what is really a fresh evidence case. There, while the defendant admitted he had assaulted
the deceased on a given day, his defense was that he had not killed him, and there were sev-
eral trial witnesses who testified to having seen the deceased alive after the date on which
the Crown claimed he had been killed. Id. ¶¶ 14–20. The Commission produced fresh evi-
dence from additional, credible witnesses, who had seen him alive after the alleged date of
death, and who had even talked to him in some instances—evidence more compelling than
the evidence at trial. Id. ¶¶ 32, 108–10. The court quashed the conviction, agreeing with the
Commission that it appeared the police had improperly filtered out any evidence that was
inconsistent with their theory that the defendant had committed the crime. Id. ¶¶ 120–28.
137 See Neeson v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 68 [2] (Scot.).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. ¶ 6. By the time the case was heard, two of the witnesses had died. Id. ¶ 6, 7. The
Court reasoned that the acceptance of this evidence in the form of affidavits was appropriate
given that two of the declarants were now deceased and given the possibility that such dec-
larations may assist the defendant in his petitioning and may be used “for what [they are]
worth.” Id.
141 Id. ¶ 6. One witness, Alexander Hardie, stated that Elliot had told him he framed the
defendant. Id. ¶ 8 (“I observed that John Elliott was in what appeared to be a state of nerves
and anxiety. He was rubbing his hands. . . . He eventually said that he had done ‘a bad thing.’
I simply asked him what is it . . . and his reply was that he had to ‘frame wee Ronnie.’” (quot-
ing Affidavit of Alexander Hardie, ¶ 2 (Feb. 17, 1993)). An affidavit from James Charles
Coyle who was with Elliot on the day he confessed to Hardie asserted that Elliot said he was
going to retract the statements he had made about the defendant and was going to the soli-
citor to do so. Id. ¶ 9.
142 Id. ¶ 12. In his declaration, Gronan stated that Elliot said “he had done a wrong thing
and had put the appellant and his own brother . . . in for a murder.” Id. ¶ 12. He was waiting
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The Court was not persuaded that this evidence was credible or reliable or
capable of impacting the jury’s verdict.143 As to Gronan, the court pointed to 1) the
13 year delay in coming forward; 2) the fact that Gronan did not say that Elliot
admitted that the information he gave about appellant and his brother was untrue;
and 3) the fact that Gronan had not clearly stated that Elliott regretted anything more
than blaming the two men.144 As to the other witnesses to Elliot’s statement, who
were dead by the time of the hearing, the Court noted there was no reason offered
for the extensive delay in coming forward and, again, the testimony about Elliot did
not indicate specifically that his testimony against the appellant was false.145
Even if credible, however, the court was clearly of the view that the fresh evi-
dence was not significant enough to require quashing, in essence, that it was cumu-
lative. It seems that new credibility evidence must be extremely powerful to avoid
being dismissed as cumulative. Elliot had been cross examined extensively as to his
credibility,146 and denied that he had fabricated evidence in return for immunity.147
The fresh evidence was not significant enough to change the verdict.148
As it did on the same subject in Neeson, the court has repeatedly relied on the
cumulativeness of fresh credibility evidence in refusing to quash a conviction, which
is generally the approach of U.S. courts addressing newly discovered evidence
claims that attack the credibility of trial witnesses.149 It also has upheld convictions
for the appellant’s brother to take him to the solicitor’s office. Id. He had stuck Ronnie and
his brother to get himself out of a firearms charge. Id. He had heard a lot of talk about the
trial and had heard threats, so he had gone to London and the next time he was back he heard
that the appellant and Elliot were serving life sentences. Id. ¶ 13. Later, he was threatened
and then attacked and told to “stay out of it.” Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Affidavit of William Gronan,
(Feb. 20, 2002)).
143 Id. ¶16.
144 Id. ¶¶ 17, 20.
145 Id. ¶ 23.
146 Id. ¶ 22.
147 Id.
148 See also Thomson v. H.M. Advocate, [2009] HCJAC 11 (Scot.) (noting that although
evidence of the circumstances surrounding prior statements of complainer, indicating a threat
to make up a false accusation, was not available, and even assuming the evidence’s reliabil-
ity, it would still not be material); Bishop v. Procurator Fiscal, [2005] HCJAC 40 [15] (Scot.)
(expressing that the victim’s prior instances of making false allegations of rape against a third
party were not material—as they “can have little bearing on her credibility and reliability
when speaking to witnessing an entirely different episode of sexual abuse on another person
a decade later”); McCormack v. H.M. Advocate [2005] HCJAC 38 [7, 19] (Scot.) (rejecting
both (1) the allegations that the cause of the quarrel leading to the murder was the deceased
informing the defendant that he might not be the father of her child and (2) that she had bitten
him, and holding that the defendant’s purported recollection that the bandage wound around
the deceased’s neck by chance when engaged in a scuffle not credible or reliable in light of the
pathologist’s testimony that the bandage was most likely intentionally wound twice around
the deceased’s neck with the ends crossed over in a tie).
149 See Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective,
16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1241, 1282 (2001).
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based on its conclusion that the defense would not have presented the fresh evidence
as a matter of strategy at trial, had that evidence been available. Thus, for example,
in O’Donnell v. H.M. Advocate,150 the evidence against the defendant came from the
testimony of a longtime friend, but the Crown did not disclose his prior police state-
ments and evidence from a third party contradicting his trial testimony.151 The court
held that the substance of these statements was known to the defense, but, in any
event, their use on cross-examination would have presented a danger to the defense
(because the witness and defendant had been close associates). Thus, to prove that
the witness was a liar would have harmed the defendant.152 In any event, he had been
extensively questioned, and nothing would have been gained by further cross-ex-
amination.153 This second-guessing of defense strategy seems a bit of a reach as a
basis to avoid quashing a conviction.
C. Scientific Evidence
The SCCRC referred several cases on the basis of new scientific evidence. Two
of those cases involved the results of a sophisticated method of DNA testing that had
not been available at the time of trial and had become available as a result of sci-
entific developments.154 Three cases involved fresh psychological evidence from Dr.
Gisli Gudjonsson,155 whose scale of suggestibility and compliance is used to evaluate
150 O’Donnell v. H.M. Advocate, [2011] HJAC 84 (Scot.).
151 Id. ¶¶ 15, 25. The Crown failed to disclose to the defense that the witness’s girlfriend
had made statements to the police that were contrary to the claims made against the defen-
dant, including that the witness had told his girlfriend that he had assisted in covering up the
murder at issue. Id. ¶ 25.
152 Id. ¶ 73 (noting that “the statements which were disclosed following upon the trial
would not have enabled the extensive cross-examination . . . to go beyond the scope that it
originally possessed[, and] those statements would not have added anything material to the
defence case”).
153 Id. ¶ 80. Cf. Affleck v. H.M. Advocate, [2010] HCJAC 61 [20], [28], [31], [40] (Scot.)
(explaining that a showing of the defendant’s actual knowledge of the undisclosed material
would undercut any claim of miscarriage of justice); Gordon v. H.M. Advocate, [2010] HCJAC
44 [82], [85] (Scot.) (stating that the defense’s knowledge of suppressed evidence is not
determinative, but that what is done with such knowledge may be decisive); McCormack v.
H.M. Advocate, [2005] HCJAC 38 [20] (noting that changing the guise of old evidence is
not the same as proffering new evidence).
154 See, e.g., In re Kelly, (2004) App. No. XC458/03 (Scot.); see also Ian Johnston, DNA
Flaws Set to Clear Officer Jailed for Rape, THE SCOTSMAN, Nov. 23, 2003, at 5 [hereinafter
Johnston, DNA Flaws]; Ian Johnston, Judges Clear Policeman Convicted of Rape on DNA
Evidence, THE SCOTSMAN, Aug. 7, 2004, at 5 [hereinafter Johnston, Judges Clear Policeman].
155 See generally Gisli Gudjonsson Awarded CBE, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON, http://www
.kcl.ac.uk/iop/news/records/2011/june2011/Gisli-Gudjonsson-awarded-CBE.aspx (last visited
Apr. 16, 2013); Bob Woffinden, Confessions of a Forensic Psychologist, THE GUARDIAN,
Dec. 17, 2002, at 16.
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the reliability of a confession.156 Dr. Gudjonsson’s scientific analysis had not been
developed until about 15 years ago and thus was not available at the time of the
relevant trials.157 Generally, in the cases involving his testimony, the basis of the
reference was that Dr. Gudjonsson’s fresh evidence established that the applicants
were so vulnerable and compliant when questioned by the police that the statements
they made were unreliable.158 Since the statements in all of these cases were the basis
of the Crown’s evidence, the resulting convictions would be a miscarriage of justice.
As noted above, as it generally does with fresh credibility evidence, the prosecu-
tion conceded in all of these cases that there was a reasonable explanation for why the
evidence had not been presented before and did not contest its receipt on appeal.159
Ultimately, as with the other fresh evidence cases, each case turned on the signifi-
cance of the fresh scientific evidence, i.e., whether the jury would have been “bound
to acquit” having heard the evidence, or, if not, whether their “verdict reached in
ignorance of its existence must be regarded as a miscarriage of justice.”160
Here are a few examples. In Gilmour v. H.M. Advocate,161 the court held that
new psychological evidence was credible and sufficiently important to require that
the conviction be quashed.162 Significantly, however, the corroborating evidence of
the statements’ unreliability was strong, even without the fresh scientific evidence.163
The defendant had twice confessed, but, as is the hallmark of unreliable confessions,
both confessions had immediately been retracted.164 Moreover, there were inconsis-
tencies between the appellant’s confessions and the facts, other possible sources of
the defendant’s alleged special knowledge of certain facts, and testimony from
police that they had not believed his first confession and that he had been in distress
156 See Woffinden, supra note 155.
157 See id.
158 See, e.g., Wilson v. H.M. Advocate, [2009] HCJAC 58 [38] (Scot.); see also Woffinden,
supra note 155.
159 See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
160 Wilson, HCJAC 58 [73, 74] (quoting Kidd v. H.M. Advocate, (2000) J.C. 509). To this
end, the court was quick to make clear that the issue was not one of guilt or innocence. Gilmour
v. H.M. Advocate, [2007] HCJAC [82] (Scot.) (“The critical question is as to the effect that
the new evidence might have had on the minds of the jury.” (citing Johnston v. H.M. Advocate
(2006), S.C.C.R. 236)).
161 Gilmour, HCJAC 48.
162 Id. ¶¶ 119–21 (noting that the evidence now adduced before the court shows that in the
aggregate the results of a newly founded psychological evaluation of the defendant, the fac-
tual errors in his statements and the lack of forensic evidence against him, cast doubt on the
reliability of the confessions that were essential to the conviction and would have been of
great consideration to the jury had it been presented).
163 Id. ¶ 87 (noting that the expert’s review of the results on the Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire (EPQ) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) tests
used at defendant’s trial, and prior to new scientific advancements, although of limited value
in themselves, indicated the defendant’s vulnerability).
164 Id. ¶¶ 43, 67, 104, 115.
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when he confessed.165 There was no forensic evidence linking the defendant to the
crime and no eyewitnesses.166 Accordingly, given the substantial evidence of un-
reliability and the importance of the confession, the court quashed the conviction.167
Presumably, under the statutory standard for fresh evidence, this scientific evidence
was not considered cumulative evidence of unreliability because it was powerful,
based on scientific expertise, and did not come from a witness who had already
testified at trial.
The court reached the opposite result in Beattie v. H.M. Advocate,168 and Wilson
v. H.M. Advocate,169 in which it held that Dr. Gudjonsson’s fresh evidence was not
important enough to warrant quashing the conviction.170 In Beattie, the Commission
had referred the case because it believed the confession was unreliable based on Dr.
Gudjonsson’s results.171 However, no record of the actual police interrogation ex-
isted, so it was impossible to know whether there had actually been any threatening,
coercive, or leading conduct by the police.172 At the same time, there was evidence
that the defendant had special knowledge of the location of the murder, the murder
weapon, and the deceased’s body and belongings, and a finding of blood matching
165 Id. ¶ 101 (“The first and most serious problem that the confessions raise is that the
appellant described numerous details that were inconsistent with the facts.”). For example,
the defendant stated that “he hit the deceased three or four times on the head with a piece of
wood,” when the “police officers present at the post mortem could recall no sign that the
deceased had been struck in that way.” Id. Similarly, he claimed that “he had strangled the
deceased with ‘her tie or the strap of her bag’ (first confession) or ‘her tie or belt from her
bag’ (second confession), whereas she was strangled with a piece of rough twine.” Id.
166 Id. ¶ 16 (“Both D Supt Brown and DCI McMath concluded that he had lied when he
confessed to the murder. D Supt Brown decided to release him.”).
167 Id. ¶¶ 121, 123.
168 Beattie v. H.M. Advocate, [2009] HCJAC 22 (Scot.).
169 Wilson v. H.M. Advocate, [2009] HCJAC 58 (Scot.).
170 Beattie, HCJAC 22 [87] (“While, accordingly, the test results. . . were evidence which
was not heard at the trial . . . they are not, in our view, significant.”); Wilson, HCJAC 58 [81]
(“We consider that the jury would have found Professor Gudjonsson’s evidence relevant; it was
on the basis of the appellant’s vulnerability that the defence was presented to the jury. But
we do not think that it would be reasonable to conclude that the verdict of the jury, reached
in ignorance of its existence, must be regarded as a miscarriage of justice.”).
171 Beattie, [2009] HCJAC 22 [74] (“The Commission has considered current judicial
attitudes towards such psychological evidence in both Scotland and England. It appears to the
Commission that, in light of developments and advances made in the area of forensic psy-
chology since the date of Mr Beattie’s trial, there should be a reconsideration of the evidence
led, with particular reference to the statements made by him. Investigations carried out by the
Commission, particularly into the reports from Professor Cooke and Professor Gudjonsson,
suggest that, in terms of the scientific methodology which can now be applied in cases of this
type, Mr Beattie’s statements may be regarded as unreliable.”).
172 Id. ¶ 83 (“There was no suggestion at the trial that the appellant had been physically
coerced into giving any part of the narratives which he gave. Although the appellant gave
accounts to each of Professors Cooke and Gudjonsson that he had been bullied by the police,
there is no evidence before us on which we could make a finding to that effect.”).
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the deceased’s blood on tissues in the jacket that the defendant had worn on the
night of the murder.173 Thus, absent the expert opinion, there was no reason to reject
the defendant’s confession as unreliable.
In Wilson, two defendants had confessed and, fifteen years later were tested by
Professor Gudjonsson.174 But while the court accepted his opinion that the two were
vulnerable when questioned, his findings were deemed not especially compelling.
The test came many years after the confessions, and did not present a strong measure
of vulnerability.175 Even assuming that it did, again, other circumstances demon-
strated that the confessions were reliable: they were not retracted and there was no
explanation for the defendants’ special knowledge of the crime.176 In short, even
conceding the credibility and reliability of the fresh scientific evidence, the court
evaluated the entire case to determine whether the confessions were reliable and to
decide whether it was a miscarriage of justice to rely on them.
These cases lead to several conclusions. First, the SCCRC is not afraid to refer
a case based on real fresh evidence, even where the court ultimately concludes that
the verdict should stand. Reading between the lines, there seems little doubt that the
SCCRC thought there was a question of Beattie’s guilt, but the real issue was
whether presenting his confessions was unfair. Ultimately, the court concluded that
they were reliable.177
A similar analysis applies to the DNA cases. In these cases, it was not contested
that the evidence was scientifically unavailable at the time of the trials, so that the
admissibility of the new scientific evidence was not contested.178 Again, however,
the court focused on the significance of the DNA evidence in the entire case.179
In re Kelly180 is an interesting case in that regard. In that case, the SCCRC pro-
duced expert evidence about the possibility of cross-contamination of a DNA sample
that was central to the case.181 While the court held that the risk of cross-contamination
was low, the fact that there would have been insufficient evidence to convict had the
jury rejected the DNA evidence required that the conviction be quashed.182
173 Id. ¶ 48 (rejecting the contentions of the defense that the defendant could have come into
possession of the relevant information through his contacts with police and media without
having been at the scene at the time of the murder, either as the murderer or as an onlooker).
174 Wilson, HCJAC 58 [37], [43], [76].
175 Id. ¶ 54.
176 Id. ¶ 80.
177 Beattie, HCJAC 22, ¶ 87.
178 In re Kelly, (2004) App. No. XC458/03, ¶ 23 (Scot.) (stating that the availability of
new scientific evidence relating to DNA comparative techniques, which was at the heart of
whether there was a reasonable explanation why that evidence was not heard at the trial, was
not contested).
179 Id. ¶ 22.
180 (2004) App. No. XC458/03 (Scot.).
181 See id.; see also Johnston, DNA Flaws, supra note 154; Johnston, Judges Clear Policeman,
supra note 154.
182 In re Kelly, App. No. XC458/03, ¶¶ 22, 24.
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In Casey v. H.M. Advocate,183 the court reached the opposite conclusion. There,
the referral was based on new analysis of DNA evidence on a glove worn by one of
the defendants during the crime. Whoever wore the glove would have been the
lookout and not the murderer, so the identity of the glove wearer was central to the
case.184 While the new DNA evidence identified the defendant’s DNA on the glove,
there was no evidence about when the DNA on the glove was deposited, or how.185
Thus, the court held that the fresh evidence would not have changed the verdict.186
D. New Legal Issues
1. Discovery
The failure of the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence is the legal issue
on which the largest percentage of the SCCRC’s referrals rested.187 This statistic,
and the kinds of discovery cases the SCCRC has referred, demonstrates that the
Commission takes discovery violations quite seriously.
Under Scottish law, the Crown has an obligation to disclose all police statements
of witnesses who are to be led at trial.188 The underlying theory is “equality of arms
183 [2011] HCJAC 19.
184 Id. ¶ 37. According to defense counsel:
[t]he fresh evidence about DNA was consistent with the appellant’s
having worn the white gloves. That DNA evidence would have assisted
the appellant’s defence counsel at the trial: both accused had a motive
to lie about who was wearing the white gloves, and the appellant’s coun-
sel was actively seeking forensic evidence which would support the ap-
pellant’s evidence. Accordingly the fresh DNA evidence was indeed
significant, and was powerful material with which to attack McNairn’s
account of events and to provide support for the appellant’s account.
Id.
185 Id. ¶ 48 (stating that “the fresh DNA evidence does not categorically establish that the
appellant was wearing the white gloves at the time of the attack—far from it”).
186 Id. ¶ 49 (“In the result we consider that the DNA evidence, with its limitations, is not
of such significance that it is reasonable to conclude that the verdict of the jury, reached in
ignorance of its existence, must be regarded as a miscarriage of justice.”).
187 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. What makes this an interesting issue
is that the SCCRC has the authority to get documents from anyone or any public body, so
that it has access to much that the Crown may never have seen, including police records,
social services records, and the like. Accordingly, the SCCRC may well uncover police rec-
ords that should have been disclosed to the defense but were not, but of which the Crown
was unaware. This is in contrast to what occurs in the United States, where a document that
is not disclosed by the police to the prosecution is for all intents and purposes, lost.
188 See McInnes v. H.M. Advocate, [2008] HCJAC 53 [21] (Scot.) (holding that “[t]here
is no duty on the defence to ask for witness statements; it is the duty of the Crown to disclose
them”); Gordon v. H.M. Advocate, [2010] HCJAC 44 [63] (Scot.) (“The Crown had a duty,
both at common law and in terms of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
1180 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1153
between the two sides.”189 When such disclosure is not made, the court must deter-
mine whether this resulted in an unfair trial.190 The duty is breached if access to the
statement “would have been of material assistance to the defense.”191 It will also be
breached “if, having regard to the realities of the trial and viewing the matter real-
istically, the denial of access might have prejudiced the defence.”192 This assessment
must be made on a case-by-case basis.193
As with the fresh evidence appeals, in most of the discovery cases, the question
of whether material evidence should have been disclosed was either conceded by the
Crown or not contested. Again, the real issue for the SCCRC and the court was
whether the information that was not disclosed was significant enough to the verdict
to change the result (what we in the United States would call “materiality”). Exami-
nation of the decisions reveals that the SCCRC takes a broad view of this question
and is willing to refer cases in which the degree of materiality is debatable. In turn,
the court dismissed several of these appeals. As with the fresh credibility evidence
cases discussed above, those dismissals were based on a detailed analysis of what
took place at trial and a conclusion that the non-disclosed materials would have
been cumulative,194 would not have been of help to the defense or jury,195 or, in fact,
for strategic reasons, would not have occurred since the materials would not have
been used by defense counsel in any event.196 On the basis of this very specific
Fundamental Freedoms, to disclose, in advance of trial, information in their possession which
was capable of either weakening the prosecution case or strengthening the defence case[.]”).
189 McInnes, HCJAC 53 [18] (quoting Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate, (2005) S.C. 28).
190 Id. ¶ 17 (“[F]ailure by the Crown to disclose a prior statement of a witness does not of
itself give rise to an infringement of an accused’s right to a fair trial. It is the significance of
that non-disclosure in the context of the actual trial which is of importance to whether the
right is infringed.”).
191 Id. ¶ 20.
192 Id.
193 Id. (“Whether there has been or may have been such prejudice will be a matter for as-
sessment by the appeal court in the circumstances of each case. Such an assessment will not
always be a straightforward or easy task.”).
194 E.g., Neeson v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 68 (Scot.); supra notes 137–47 and
accompanying text; see also O’Donnell v. H.M. Advocate, [2011] HCJAC 84 [73] (Scot.)
(“In our view, the statements which were disclosed following upon the trial would not have
enabled the extensive cross-examination . . . to go beyond the scope that it originally pos-
sessed. Putting the matter in another way, those statements would not have added anything
material to the defence case.”); cf. Al-Megrahi v. H.M. Advocate, [2002] HCJAC 99 ¶ 219
(Scot.) (“In an appeal based on the existence and significance of additional evidence not
heard at the trial, the court will quash the conviction if it is satisfied that the original jury, if
it had heard the new evidence, would have been bound to acquit.”).
195 McInnes v. H.M. Advocate, [2008] HCJAC 53 [15] (Scot.) (“The proper question was
not whether disclosure of that material would have made a difference to the outcome of the
trial, but whether it could have made a difference.”).
196 See supra note 108; see also O’Donnell, HCJAC 84 [84] (“First, it may be that the ap-
pellant’s then advisers did not appreciate the potential significance of the material concerned.
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second-guessing of the impact of non-disclosure on the proceedings, the court re-
fused to quash in several cases.197
Another observation about the discovery cases is that many of them arise out of
old convictions that occurred in the 1980s, or before, when discovery obligations
were not as broad as they are today.198 For example, in Gordon,199 the court noted
that the practice at the time—2001—had been not to turn over prior statements of
witnesses, as is currently required, but rather to give “lines of evidence,” i.e., written
synopses of the statements that excluded personal details.200 In those circumstances,
non-disclosure probably was more routine. Still, if the non-disclosure was material,
the conviction would be quashed.201
2. Successful Appeals
Kidd v. H.M. Advocate202 was one of the first successful discovery cases. Tried
in 1996 and convicted of culpable homicide, Kidd was convicted of stabbing the
deceased to death based entirely on the eyewitness testimony of two people, Pamela
and Richard Carlyle.203 The SCCRC received copies of all of the witness statements
Secondly, it may be that they did appreciate the potential significance of the material and that
they decided not to make use of it as a matter of professional judgment, having regard to the
possible dangers inherent in its use. Thirdly, it may be that they did decide to use it in some
way or other, but, in the event, omitted to do so.”).
197 See, e.g., O’Donnell, HCJAC 84 [84] (Scot.).
198 The Crown has an obligation to disclose to the defense all the police statements of all
the witnesses who will testify at the trial. See McInnes v. H.M. Advocate, [2008] HCJAC 53
[18] (Scot.) (“It so helps because disclosure of such statements may, depending on how the
trial develops, be of value to the defence for the purposes of cross-examination or otherwise,
the prosecutor being assumed to have access, or the means of access, to them for the pur-
poses of the presentation of his case. When such disclosure is not made, it will be necessary
to assess, in the circumstances of the particular trial, whether this has resulted in the trial as
a whole being unfair.”); Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate, [2005] UKPC D 2 [49] (Scot.) (“This
helps to ensure that there is equality of arms between the two sides.”); see also Peter Duff,
Disclosure Appeals: McInnes v. H.M. Advocate, 14 EDINBURGH L. R. 483, 483–87 (2010)
(describing the development of disclosure obligations in the Scottish High Court).
199 Gordon, HCJAC 44.
200 Id. ¶ 43.
201 Cf. Gordon, HCJAC 44, [72] (“[A]s a generality, even if there had been no deliberate
action on the part of the police to suppress evidence, a trial could be unfair because of the
loss of evidence caused by mere bungling. The test was one of oppression: were the errors
so great that the appellant had been deprived of the possibility of a fair trial”); Beattie v. H.M.
Advocate, [2009] HCJAC 22 [71]–[72] (Scot.) (“In the present case, the Advocate depute’s
concession allows us to look at a 1973 conviction through twenty-first century eyes and to con-
clude that, however the test is formulated, and even expressing it in terms most favourable to
the appellant, nothing unfair resulted from the failure of the Crown . . . information . . . [that]
would have made no practical difference to the conduct of the trial or the jury’s deliberations.”).
202 [2005] HCJAC 13 (Scot.).
203 Id. ¶ 5 (noting that eye-witness testimony was the sole evidence of the assault).
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to the police and in precognition.204 None of these statements had been revealed to
the defense, but, as the court later explained, they “revealed such a degree of con-
tradiction and inconsistency that they should have been disclosed to those represent-
ing the appellant.”205 The Crown did not dispute that Pamela Carlyle’s prior statements
should have been disclosed, but argued that this non-disclosure did not result in a
miscarriage of justice.206 The Crown did dispute its obligation to disclose the prior
statements of Richard Carlyle.207
The court held that the failure to disclose the prior statements of Pamela Carlyle
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.208 In her prior statements, she variously identi-
fied both the defendant and the co-defendant as the killer and continually changed
her version of what she had seen.209 With the case in this posture, the court did not
reach the question of the disclosure of Richard Carlyle’s prior statements.210
Gair v. H.M. Advocate,211 was referred based on prior statements to the police
by three identification witnesses that had not been disclosed.212 In one of these
statements, the witness admitted he had lied before and identified the appellant as
five feet six or five feet seven inches, when the appellant was six feet or six feet one
inches tall.213 As to the second witness, he had stated to the police that he had not
204 Id. ¶ 12 (“As part of the Commission’s investigations, Crown Office provided to the
Commission copies of the police statements and the Crown precognitions of the principal
Crown witnesses. It is common ground that these statements and precognitions were never
disclosed to those representing the appellant prior to, or in the course of, the trial.”).
205 Id. ¶ 13.
206 Id. ¶ 19 (recognizing that “[w]hile the Crown had conceded that the statements which
Pamela Carlyle had made to the police should have been disclosed to the defence, the court
would still have to be satisfied that the failure to disclose the statements had resulted in a
miscarriage of justice”).
207 Id. ¶ 18 (noting that the Crown did not recognize a duty to disclose certain witness
statements).
208 Id. ¶ 23.
209 Id. ¶ 22 (noting inconsistencies in Pamela Carlyle’s statements to the police).
210 Id. ¶ 24.
211 [2006] HCJAC 52 [11].
212 Id. ¶ 11 (“[T]he Crown had failed to disclose material information to the defence prior
to or at the trial. This information consisted of (I) previous statements to the police given by
the witnesses Alan John Gillon, Brian Morrison and P.C. Shirley Marnock, which were at
variance with the evidence that they gave at the trial relating to their identification of the
appellant; and (ii) information of a personal nature in relation to Brian Morrison.”).
213 Id. ¶ 16. Setting up his discrepant accounts, he was first quoted by police, as referenced
in the now unsuppressed notes, stating
there are a number of things which I did not tell you about in my earlier
statement because I was terrified. I would now like to tell the truth, not
that I have lied to you previously, I just didn’t tell you everything but
it has been playing on my mind especially when the guy died.
Id.
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seen who committed the crime and that he had made his story up for attention.214
Also not disclosed was a note attached to the witness’s precognition that indicated
the witness had been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons and that “his vivid imagi-
nation certainly set the police off on the trail of a red herring initially.”215 As to the
third identification witness, she had given a description that included a wrong esti-
mate of height and weight for both suspects, and an erroneous identification of the
co-defendant, although she had identified the defendant in a lineup.216
The Crown conceded that all four statements should have been disclosed.217 As
to the evidence of hospitalization, the court noted “[i]t would have painted a com-
pletely different picture of Morrison from the one the jury was presented with and
would have tended dramatically to undermine the credibility and reliability of his
evidence and, in particular, his identification evidence.”218 “Non-disclosure of the
information meant that there was no equality of arms between the Crown and the
defence in relation to Morrison . . . .”219 The court concluded “[i]t is not possible to
say that without his evidence the jury would nevertheless have convicted.”220
In Allison v. H.M. Advocate,221 the police had information that the deceased had
been seen alive after the date on which he was allegedly murdered, but they did not
disclose this information to the prosecutor.222 In fact, the court concluded that the
police had “obstinately rejected all evidence that did not fit their theory” that the
deceased had been killed on November 3 and had deliberately attempted to mislead
the Crown.223 Accordingly, the conviction was quashed.224
Allison is an illustration of the importance of the SCCRC’s ability to get docu-
ments from any source. In that case, the SCCRC was able to inspect police docu-
ments of which the Crown had been unaware. In the United States, if the police
withhold documents from the prosecution there is no effective way to find them.
214 Id. ¶ 19.
215 Id. ¶ 21.
216 Id. ¶¶ 23, 27 (noting discrepancies in witness statements).
217 Id. ¶ 13 (“[T]he Crown conceded that P’s statements should have been disclosed. . . .”).
218 Id. ¶ 38.
219 Id.
220 Id. ¶ 39.
221 [2006] HCJAC 30 (Scot.).
222 Id. ¶ 123 (explaining that the police “suppressed and altered evidence casting doubt on
their theory of the date of death”).
223 Id. ¶ 121, 126 (“On the fuller information available to us, we conclude that the police
deliberately misled the Crown in a serious way. The result was that the procurator fiscal, and
in consequence the defence, were kept unaware of evidence having a material bearing on a
vital issue. The police thereby induced the Crown to adopt the police theory of the date of
the murder and to challenge the credibility and reliability of any defence witness who cast
doubt on it. That, in our opinion, was grave misconduct.”).
224 Id. ¶ 128.
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3. Unsuccessful Appeals
Examination of the referred discovery cases that were not successful provides
an interesting window into the workings of the SCCRC. These cases support the
conclusion that the SCCRC is willing to refer a case in which there is a serious pro-
secutorial failure to disclose, even if the significance of the undisclosed materials
may be arguable.225
For example, in Affleck v. H.M. Advocate,226 the evidence against the defendant
depended on two witnesses: 1) his former girlfriend, who claimed he confessed to
her; and 2) an alleged eyewitness who claimed he saw the defendant running away
from the fatal fire.227 The witness continuously equivocated about whether he had
seen the defendant running from the fire, or whether he could not remember who
was running, but ultimately he stated he saw the defendant running from the scene.228
During the course of its investigation, the SCCRC discovered that there had been
two outstanding cases against the witness relating to his drug dealing, and that this
information had not been disclosed to defense counsel.229 In one of these cases, the
defendant would have been a witness.230 Evidence showed that the witness’s solicitor
met with the Crown prior to his testimony at defendant’s trial. After his testimony,
a formal offer from the Crown was sent, which resulted in a guilty plea to one set
of charges, and the Crown’s decision not to proceed with the second.231
The Court held that this information should have been disclosed to the defense232
but found no miscarriage of justice because, “there was [no] real possibility that the
225 It is interesting that these cases were referred by the SCCRC even though there were
reasonable arguments that disclosure would not have changed the verdict. One could argue
that the SCCRC courageously referred the cases since it does not have to meet any so-called
real-possibility-of-winning-the-appeal test, as does the CCRC. On the other hand, it may be
that even with a real possibility test the cases would have been referred. Either way, what
these cases do show is that the SCCRC is doing its job of submitting potential miscarriages
based on discovery violations. One could suggest that such non-disclosure is something that
should be brought to the court’s attention and that the SCCRC is right to do so.
226 [2010] HCJAC 61 (Scot.).
227 Id. ¶¶ 6–9. The Crown relied on this witness, who was under the influence of heroin
at the time of the event, to identify the defendant. Id. ¶ 9.
228 Id. ¶ 9.
229 Id. ¶ 20.
230 Id. ¶ 21. It appeared that the witness had engaged in drug trafficking and had sold
drugs to the appellant. Id.
231 Id. Counsel for the defendant stressed this sequence of events. Id. ¶ 23. Counsel as-
serted that it “demonstrated that Devine gave his evidence, at the trial, before any offer had
been made by the Crown . . . [and] [t]here was close proximity in time between the giving
of his evidence at the appellant’s trial and the dropping of certain of the drugs charges.” Id.
(“At the time of the trial, the appellant was a witness to one of those charges and therefore
was someone against whom Devine fell to be regarded as hostile.”).
232 Id. ¶ 23 (“There could be no doubt that the existence of the outstanding charges against
Devine ought to have been disclosed to the appellant’s representatives.”).
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jury would have arrived at a different verdict.”233 In essence, the evidence of a deal
was deemed cumulative. According to the court, the witness had already been shown
to be unreliable and incredible.234 Moreover, the witness had implicated the defen-
dant before that the witness had been charged with the offense involving him235 and
the newly discovered crimes did not relate to credibility. Moreover, the court con-
cluded, if he had been fabricating to curry a more favorable sentence, he would have
done a better job.236 These clearly were inferences that could have been drawn by
the jury.237 Thus, the court refused to quash the conviction.238
In McInnes v. H.M. Advocate,239 the Crown failed to disclose a statement by a
witness who identified another person in a lineup, because, according to the court,
the witness had qualified his statement that he was unsure.240 Also, since he identi-
fied two other people as familiar, and one clearly was not, the misidentification was
itself clearly wrong.241 Thus, the non-disclosed statement was weak additional evi-
dence on reliability. In addition, the court again made assumptions about defense
strategy, concluding that pressing the witness on identification would have brought
out the fact that the defendant had changed his facial appearance.242 Thus, given that
the defendant probably would not have used the evidence, its absence could not
establish a miscarriage of justice.243
Although the court rarely comments on the SCCRC’s decision to refer, there
have been discovery cases in which the court has taken the SCCRC to task for its
referral. In Kinsella v. H.M. Advocate,244 for example, the SCCRC first refused to
refer a case, then after receiving additional materials from the applicant, changed its
233 Id. ¶ 39 (stating that the suppressed information did not involve those relating to the
witness’s “dishonesty or attempting to pervert the course of justice, [and] would . . . not have
added materially to the jury’s conclusion in relation to this witness’s evidence where they
knew that he had been a liar in the past and, in particular had told lies to the police”).
234 Id. (“As we have made plain it was clear that the witness Devine was a witness whose
reliability and credibility were very much in issue before the jury, given the content of that evi-
dence and the manner of its delivery. This was not a witness who would have presented to
the jury as a potentially reliable and credible witness, until that credibility and reliability was
undermined by material which showed that all was not necessarily as it seemed to be, by rea-
son of outstanding charges against the witness, which touched upon questions of dishonesty.”).
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. ¶ 42.
239 [2008] HCJAC 53 (Scot.).
240 Id. ¶¶ 4–6.
241 Id. ¶ 22.
242 Id.
243 Id. (noting that if the witness was pressed on his identification it “was likely to bring
out a potentially damning explanation” which related to the defendant’s change of facial
appearance); see also id. ¶ 24.
244 [2011] HCJAC 58 (Scot.).
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mind and referred it.245 One of the bases for referral was the failure of the prosecu-
tion to disclose the photo lineup from which the eyewitness had identified the appli-
cant, which showed that his photo was very old.246 There was no other significant
way for the defense to impeach this witness’s testimony.247
The Crown conceded that disclosure was required, but argued that the failure to
disclose did not make the conviction unfair.248 The court essentially agreed, but took
the opportunity to make clear that in cases where the issue is the significance of non-
disclosure, the SCCRC had set the bar too low.249 It chose to remind the SCCRC that
the standard is, “whether, given that there was a failure to disclose and having regard
to what actually happened at the trial, the trial was nevertheless fair.”250 The test that
should be applied is “whether there is a real possibility that if the material had been
disclosed the appellant would have had a realistic prospect of acquittal, taking into
account all the circumstances of the trial.”251
Thus, the court rejected the Commission’s speculation that the witnesses would
not have identified the applicant if a current photograph had been contained in the
array, noting that this approach failed to acknowledge the witness was clear that she
concentrated on and identified him by his eyes.252 There also was evidence cor-
roborating her identification, including a description that matched the defendant, the
similarity between his knife and the unusual knife used by the criminal, and the
245 Id. ¶ 2.
246 Id. ¶ 4 (“The failure to disclose the photographs, in particular the fact that the photo-
graph of the appellant was ten years old, deprived the appellant’s counsel from considering
whether the emulator sheet was itself significant by reason of the age of the photograph and
also whether the image of the appellant on the emulator sheet was significantly different from
his appearance on the date on which the offence was committed.”).
247 Id. The Commission reasoned that:
the information contained in the photo-spread might have played a use-
ful part in the defence effort to undermine the reliability of Ms Ray’s
identification of the applicant . . . . [T]he fact that counsel was unable
to raise the age of the photograph as an issue of fairness before the trial
judge and/or in his cross examination might [] possibly have affected
the jury’s (majority) verdict.
Id.
248 Id. ¶ 7. The Crown argued that the failure to disclose did not result in a disadvantage
to the defendant. Id. It “emphasi[z]ed that in determining the issue of the fairness of the trial
it was necessary to assess the whole circumstances of the trial and [ ] submitted that, once that
had been done, it was clear that there had been no miscarriage of justice in this case.” Id.
249 Id. ¶ 13 (“[A] finding of materiality relative to the disclosability of a document is not to
be confused with a finding that it would actually have been of value to the defence nor regarded
as pre-empting the defendant’s need on appeal to establish that, but for the non-disclosure,
he would have had a realistic prospect of a acquittal.” (quoting McInnes v. H.M. Advocate,
(2010) S.C. 28, ¶ 39 (Scot.))).
250 Id. (quoting McInnes, S.C. 28, ¶ 20).
251 Id.
252 Id.
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similarity of his clothes and the clothes worn by the assailant.253 The court concluded
that, even if defense counsel had been provided the photo lineup sheet, he might not
have used it because it would have shown both that she had previously identified the
defendant and that he had a police record, which would have supported, not weak-
ened, her identification of him premised upon focusing on his eyes.254
In short, the court’s approach to the SCCRC’s referred discovery cases seems
to underestimate the power of eyewitness identification and the jury’s potential
reaction to fresh impeachment evidence of eyewitnesses at trial.
4. Historic Cases
The CCRC and the SCCRC do not operate under statutes of limitations that
would restrict review of an old conviction. An application to either commission can
be made at any time and even more than once.255 Therefore, one of the issues con-
fronting the SCCRC—as well as the U.K.’s CCRC—has been how to handle old
cases that may not have constituted miscarriages of justice under the then-current
law but that would be considered miscarriages under current law.256 The SCCRC and
the court have both taken a liberal approach to this issue.
253 Id.
254 Id. (“Indeed it appears to us that if the jury had been aware that Mrs Ray had identified
the appellant from an old photograph, that was more likely to reinforce her identification of the
appellant by the prominence of his eyes.”). Likewise, the disclosure of witnesses as to other
possible suspects, such as reports indicating a juvenile party as the possible assailant, was not
material so that the Crown’s failure to disclose that information was not a miscarriage since
it was contrary to a prior statement of a witness that 1) the juvenile person did not match the
assailant; 2) had the wrong clothes; and 3) had appeared prior to the defendant’s entrance in
the entered post office. Id. The court reasoned that disclosure simply would have revealed that
the police investigated a third party and found no evidence that he was the assailant. Id. ¶ 16.
This more practical approach grounded in the specifics at trial was also evidenced in
Beattie v. H.M. Advocate, [2009] HCJAC 22 (Scot.). In Beattie, the fact that the tests con-
cluded that there was no blood in soil samples was deemed irrelevant. Id. ¶ 67. The Crown was
aware of such facts, and knew such evidence would have been disclosed under current law
but was not. Id. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the “information contained in it about
the soil sample would have made no practical difference to the conduct of the trial or the
jury’s deliberations.” Id. ¶ 72.
255 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 43 (“There is no time limit on a person
applying to the Commission, nor is there any set limit on the number of times a conviction or
sentence can be reviewed, although generally the Commission will not accept a case for review
where the only issues raised are the same as matters it rejected in the previous review.”);
Questions and Answers About the CCRC, CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION, http://www.justice
.gov.uk/downloads/about/criminal-cases-review/policies-and-procedures/ccrc-q-and-a.pdf
(last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
256 See, e.g., R. v. Bentley, [1998] EWCA (Crim) 2516, (2001) 1 Crim. App. 21 (Eng.)
(dealing with the Commission’s approach to a challenged conviction over forty-five years
old); R. v. Hanratty, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 1141, [2002] 3 All E.R. 534 (Eng.) (dealing with
the Commission’s approach to a challenged conviction over forty years old).
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The court addressed this head on in Coubrough v. H.M. Advocate.257 There, the
court made clear that considerations of finality in the criminal process “are for the
SCCRC to take into account under the heading of ‘the interests of justice’ when
deciding whether to refer a case,” and not for the court. Rather, the court’s job is
simply to determine whether a miscarriage has occurred under its current under-
standing of justice.258 Thus, age may play an important part in whether the interests
of justice warrant referral, but the court’s present understanding of the law is to be
applied to whether a miscarriage of justice occurred.259 In determining whether there
has been a miscarriage of justice, the court must consider the “practices and proce-
dures” current at the time of trial and view the context “‘in the round’ . . . ‘taking in
to account all the relevant circumstances.’”260
In Coubrough, the court adopted the reasoning of the U.K. court’s decision in
R. v. Bentley,261 in which it held that the fairness of a trial must be judged by the
standards existing at the time an appeal is heard.262 The risk that past proceedings will
be judged by present standards, said the court in Bentley, is “inherent in section 194B
which is specifically designed to allow this court to reconsider the soundness of a con-
viction even though it was subject to appeal.”263 The purpose of that section, it noted,
is to permit reexamination of cases to see “whether, by the common law and standards
of the time when the reference is considered, there has been a miscarriage of justice,
even if . . . the appeal court would then have reached a different conclusion.”264
In Coubrough, although it evaluated the case under current standards, the court
held that the trial court’s erroneous instruction in which it effectively imposed a
burden of proof on the defendant did not result in a miscarriage of justice.265 Because
the instruction as a whole made clear that the prosecution bore the burden beyond
a reasonable doubt, there was no miscarriage, even if the charge was erroneous.266
257 [2010] HCJAC 32 (Scot.).
258 Id. ¶ 33.
259 Id. ¶ 34 (“It follows also from what was said in these two cases that, with the exception of
statutory amendments to the common law between the date of the original appeal and any subse-
quent appeal hearing, it is the Court’s present understanding of the law which must be applied.”).
260 Id. ¶¶ 35–36.
261 [1998] EWCA (Crim) 2516, (2001) 1 Crim. App. 21 (Eng.).
262 Coubrough, HCJAC 32 ¶¶ [27]–[29], [34]–[36].
263 Fraser v. H.M. Advocate, (2000) App. No. C158/00 [5] (Scot.) (describing R. v. Bentley
[1998] EWCA (Crim.) 2516).
264 Id. ¶ 5 (describing R. v. Bentley, [1998] EWCA (Crim) 2516, (2001) Crim. App. 21
(Eng.)).
265 Coubrough, [2010] HCJAC 32 (Scot.) [147], [149].
266 Id. ¶ 43. The issue on appeal, however, was whether the new psychological evidence con-
cerning defendant’s admissions constituted a miscarriage of justice. Id. ¶ 2. Richard Coubrough
was convicted of murder in 1971. Id. ¶ 1. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and, in 1999,
applied to the SCCRC. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. Although the case was not referred at that time, he applied
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The court reached the opposite conclusion in another historic case, Fraser v.
H.M. Advocate.267 There, the defendant had been convicted in 1948 based on charges
that he had assaulted his niece, took “indecencies” with her, and caused her bodily
injury.268 While there had been corroboration for the claimed beating, there was no
corroboration for the claim of “indecencies” toward her.269 In that regard, the trial
judge’s instructions to the jury, which allowed them to use the evidence that corrob-
orated the beating to corroborate the evidence of indecencies, were erroneous.270
While the court had originally found the error to be harmless when it reviewed the
conviction in 1948, the court held that it should not have done so.271 The harmless
error proviso, which was removed in 1980, was at the time “exceedingly narrow.”272
The court should have quashed the conviction in 1948, and it took the current op-
portunity, in 2000, to do so.273
5. Defective Representation
Interestingly, while the SCCRC has referred nine of its 107 cases based on claims
of defective representation, none has succeeded in court. The court is extremely
inhospitable to this type of claim.
In Scotland, Anderson v. H.M. Advocate274 established that an accused has a
right to have his defense presented as part of a right to a fair trial.275 However, given
the interest in finality, the distorting effect of hindsight,276 and the very broad scope
of discretion afforded defense counsel to identify and execute a defense strategy, the
standard established to sustain such a claim is extremely high: “There can be no
miscarriage of justice if the advocate conducts the case within his instructions ac-
cording to his own professional judgment as to what is proper for him to do in his
again and the SCCRC referred his case in 2005 on the basis of fresh psychological evidence.
Id. ¶ 2. With three credible eyewitnesses, the court held that the conviction did not constitute
a miscarriage of justice. Id. ¶¶ 48–49.
267 (2000) App. No. C158/00 (Scot.).
268 Id. ¶ 1, 8.
269 Id. ¶¶ 3, 6.
270 Id. ¶¶ 7, 11–12.
271 Id. ¶ 20.
272 Id.
273 Id. ¶¶ 20–21.
274 (1996) J.C. 29 (Scot.).
275 Id.
276 See McBrearty v. H.M. Advocate, (2004) J.C. 122, ¶ 34 (Scot.) (“In general, a com-
plete failure to put forward an important line of defence . . . will found a relevant ground of
appeal, whereas a judgment made as to the manner of presentation of such a line of defence
will not.” (citing Anderson, J.C. 29).
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client’s best interests.”277 In essence, then, there can only be a miscarriage of justice
based on defective representation when counsel fails to present a defense because
he or she “disregard[s] . . . instructions or conduct[s] the defence in a way in which
no competent counsel could reasonably have conducted it.”278
In applying this standard, the court has found the defendant had been deprived
of a failure to put in a defense by his attorney. In Garrow v. H.M. Advocate,279 the
consequence of erroneous advice by counsel was that the defendant’s evidence and
cross-examination lacked support which would have been provided by a defense
expert.280 In Hemphill v. H.M. Advocate,281 a substantial part of the Crown’s case—
evidence by a pathologist—was not investigated, either by precognoscing the Crown’s
pathologist or hiring its own.282 Finally, in A.J.E. v. H.M. Advocate,283 defense coun-
sel failed to challenge important inferences from the medical evidence and the
information they had given in police interviews.284 These show a serious failure of
counsel to present a defense.
With respect to the SCCRC’s cases, although nine cases have been referred that
raised the defective representation by defense counsel as an issue, none have
succeeded.285 That may be because, in the court’s opinion,286 the SCCRC has applied
a less stringent test than the failure to present a defense standard.287 Indeed, as the
court pointed out D.S. v. H.M. Advocate,288 the SCCRC seems to have employed a
failure to fully present a defense standard.289 Why precisely the court is so inhospitable
277 Anderson, (1996) J.C. 29, 36 (Scot.); see also Gordon v. H.M. Advocate, [2010]
HCJAC 44 [102] (Scot.) (deferring to counsel’s judgment not to call a witness stating that
“no competent counsel would have attempted to gild the lily by leading evidence to prove
undisputed fact[s]”).
278 Grant v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] J.C. 205 (Scot.) [22] (“An Anderson ground cannot rest
upon a criticism of strategic and tactical decisions reasonably and responsibly made by trial
counsel. These are matters within the scope of counsel’s legitimate judgment.”); cf. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (assessing counsel’s performance under a reason-
ably competent assistance standard, holding that constitutional deficiency will only be found
if the defendant shows that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different).
279 (1999) App. No. C591/97 (Scot.).
280 Id. ¶¶ 13–14.
281 (2001) App. No. 82/67 (Scot.).
282 Id. ¶ 19.
283 (2002) J.C. 215 (Scot.).
284 Id. ¶¶ 28–29.
285  SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 39, at 13.
286 D.S. v. H.M. Advocate, [2008] HCJAC 59 (Scot.).
287 Id. ¶ 41.
288 [2008] HCJAC 59 (Scot.)
289 Id. ¶ 42.
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to these claims is not clear, except for the traditional reasons, i.e., inability to know
what transpired between the defendant and counsel,290 deference to defense coun-
sel,291 or fear of interfering with or of setting minimum or other standards for the
performance of counsel.292
6. Police Failures or Misconduct
A handful of referred cases presented claims that the police had either failed to
investigate leads that might have produced exculpatory information or deliberately
committed misconduct.293 In McPhee v. H.M. Advocate,294 the court quashed the
conviction based on the police witness’s knowingly false testimony that forensic
evidence confirmed his opinion that a footprint at the scene matched the defendant’s
290 See id. ¶ 43 (“Many of the increasing number of Anderson appeals are based on alle-
gations of breach of instructions that rest only on the say-so of the appellant himself; or on
criticisms of decisions that are prima facie within the legitimate scope of counsel’s dis-
cretion; or on speculative allegations which the appellant’s advisers hope that they may be
able to substantiate at a later date. . . . this court should not countenance the granting of leave
to appeal in such cases.” (quoting Grant v. H.M. Advocate, 2006 J.C. 205, ¶ 23 (Scot.))).
291 Id. ¶¶ 52, 54 (deferring to counsel’s decisions on how to present a defense and the
scope of cross-examination utilized); McBrearty v. H.M. Advocate, (2004) J.C. 122, ¶ 55
(Scot.) (“These decisions were a matter for counsel’s judgment. In every judgment of this
kind there may . . . be a range of decisions that it would be reasonable to make. Anderson
appeals are not to be decided on the counsels of perfection to which hindsight lends itself.”).
292 As Lord Justice-Clerk (Gill) explained:
Those presenting such appeals should bear in mind the seriousness of
what they allege. Criminal defence work, if carried out conscientiously,
is demanding and stressful. All too often, convicted persons blame their
counsel rather than themselves for their misfortune. An Anderson ground
of appeal . . . constitutes a formal accusation against trial counsel that
he failed to present a competent and responsible defence. An Anderson
appeal puts trial counsel to the trouble of having to respond to the accu-
sation, often when the ground of appeal gives less than fair notice of what
the accusation is, or where counsel has limited recall of the case and
limited access to the papers. These difficulties are especially acute where,
as in this case, the Anderson allegations are tabled long after the trial.
All such cases cause worry to counsel until the appeal is finally resolved.
Grant v. H.M. Advocate, [2006] HCJAC 42 [24], (2006) J.C. 205 (Scot.).
293 Unlike its sister, the SCCRC has not dealt with widespread or systemic police miscon-
duct. In this regard, the CCRC has quashed over thirty convictions based on police miscon-
duct, which dealt with police acts of coercing confessions, fabricating evidence, and committing
perjury at trial. See Griffin, supra note 3, at 126. The brunt of these cases arose largely from
two police squads that engaged in various illegal methods to secure convictions in serious
crime investigations. Id.
294 [2005] HCJAC 137 (Scot.).
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shoes.295 The court found the Crown’s assertion that the police superintendent “was
not acting in bad faith . . . difficult to accept,”296 but did not undertake to resolve the
good or bad faith of the police witness. Because his evidence was vital to the jury’s
consideration, the court concluded that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. And
in Johnston v. H.M. Advocate,297 the court concluded that the police had deliberately
“filter[ed] out the existence of witnesses whose evidence might point to the deceased
having been alive after [the alleged date of the murder].”298 Because the defense might
have been presented differently had defense counsel been aware of this evidence,
and because its verdict might have been different had the jury been aware that the
deceased was alive after the alleged date of death, the court allowed the appeal and
quashed the conviction.299
When there has been no basis to conclude that the police engaged in miscon-
duct, however, the court has not allowed the appeal. Thus, for example, the failure
to pursue certain lines of investigation (such as securing CCTC footage or failing
to speak with certain witnesses) that resulted in the loss of that evidence has not
been found to result in a miscarriage of justice. In Kinsella v. H.M. Advocate, for
example, the court characterized as “speculation” the Commission’s conclusion that
the police failure to investigate deprived the defendant of a fair trial.300 The court
also cited Section 36 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which requires
that the prosecution investigate a defense “to such an extent as is reasonably practi-
cable,” to reject a claim that the police should have investigated further.301 The court
has also made clear that when the accused is represented by counsel, counsel’s
knowledge of allegedly overlooked information or counsel’s own failure to investi-
gate it will defeat any claim of miscarriage of justice.302
295 Id. ¶¶ 38, 40.
296 Id. ¶ 39.
297 [2006] HCJAC 30 (Scot.).
298 Id. ¶ 120.
299 Id. ¶ 128.
300 Kinsella v. H.M. Advocate, [2011] HCJAC 58 [10] (Scot.).
301 Id. ¶ 23 (citing The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 36(10)).
302 Id. (“In the context of our system where accused persons are provided with state funding
in the form of legal aid for the preparation and conduct of the defence we consider that the pri-
mary obligation of investigating and presenting a positive defence such as an alibi rests with
the legal representatives of an accused. They are in the best position to pursue such enquires
because they have access to the accused who can provide them with information which he
is not obliged to provide to others, including the police and prosecuting authorities.”); see
also Gordon v. H.M. Advocate, [2010] HCJAC 44 [29] (Scot.) (holding that although the
Crown had failed to turn over statements that could be useful to the defense, there was no
miscarriage of justice because the defense had been fully aware of the content of such state-
ments during trial).
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E. What Happens When There Is Nothing “New”
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In the absence of fresh evidence or a new legal issue, the SCCRC can still refer
and the court can still quash a conviction as a miscarriage of justice. One of the
grounds on which it can do so is the legal insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 section 106(3)(b).303 Under that standard,
the conviction will be quashed if the Crown cannot establish guilt of all elements of
the charge.304
This issue was the basis for referral in Campbell v. H.M. Advocate.305 In that
case, the applicant had been convicted of possession of a firearm that had been
discovered concealed behind a water tank in a cupboard in a flat that did not belong
to him but in which he had stayed overnight prior to the day it was found.306 A
number of other people had access to the flat; at least three of whom had keys.307
The occupier of the flat was the applicant’s girlfriend.308 The sole evidence against
the applicant was a single fingerprint and partial palm print on the plastic bag in
which the firearm was wrapped.309 There was no evidence that the applicant had ever
seen the rifle.310 The court held that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law
and quashed the conviction.311
The insufficient evidence argument was unsuccessful in Gage v. H.M. Advocate.312
The issue in Gage was identification, and there was no direct identification evidence.313
However, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the conviction.314
2. “Lurking Doubt”
Next to Al-Megrahi v. H.M. Advocate,315 discussed in the next section, Harper
v. H.M. Advocate316 may be the SCCRC’s most cited case. It is the only reported
303 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 106(3)(b).
304 Gage v. H.M. Advocate, [2012] HCJAC 14 [29] (Scot.) (quoting King v. H.M.
Advocate, (1999) JC 226, 228 (Scot.)).
305 [2008] HCJAC 50 (Scot.).
306 Id. ¶ 6.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id. ¶ 29.
312 [2012] HCJAC 14 (Scot.).
313 Id. ¶¶ 1, 2.
314 Id. ¶ 3.
315 [2008] HCJAC 58 (Scot.).
316 [2005] HCJAC 23 (Scot.).
1194 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1153
decision in which the SCCRC referred a case to the court based not on fresh evi-
dence or a newly raised legal issue, but rather on “lurking doubt” about the applicant’s
guilt, i.e., a belief that the jury’s verdict may have been wrong.317 The appeal did
not succeed.318
In Harper, the defendant was charged with and convicted of murder based on the
robbery and murder of John Harris, an invalid, in his home on Saturday, January 25,
1992.319 The defendant admitted that he had robbed Harris in his home the day
before, but asserted that he had not killed him.320 There was some evidence at trial
that others had received goods stolen from the deceased on Friday,321 which sup-
ported the defense because the prosecution claimed the murder and robbery had
occurred together on Saturday.322
317 In the United Kingdom, appeals can succeed if the appellate court has a “lurking doubt”
as to the veracity of the guilty verdict. See R v. Cooper, (1969) 1 Q.B. 267, 271 (holding that
the court can “in the end ask itself a subjective question, whether we are content to let the
matter stand as it is, or whether there is not some lurking doubt in our minds which makes
us wonder whether an injustice has been done. This . . . is a reaction which can be produced
by the general feel of the case as the Court experiences it”). In Scotland, the court has been
reluctant to take matters out of the jury’s hands. See Rubin v. H.M. Advocate, (1984) S.L.T.
369, 370–71 (Scot.) (refusing to quash); see also Al Megrahi v. H.M. Advocate, (2002) J.C.
99, ¶ 25 (“[I]n order to demonstrate that there was a miscarriage of justice arising from the
trial court’s verdict, an appellant had to go the length of showing that no reasonable trial court
could have reached that verdict, it made no sense if the appeal court could, by applying a lesser
standard in reliance on the general power to review any alleged miscarriage of justice, review
the inferences drawn by the trial court or could set aside the trial court’s assessment of the
reliability of evidence. . . . If evidence is capable of giving rise to two or more possible infer-
ences, it is for the trial court to decide whether an inference should be drawn and, if so, which
inference.”). But see A.J.E. v. H.M. Advocate, (2002) App. No. 42/98 (Scot.); Findlay Stark,
A Perfectly Unreasonable Decision: Jenkins v. H.M. Advocate, 16 EDINBURGH L. R. 86 (2012).
318 Harper v. H.M. Advocate, [2005] HCJAC 23 [35] (Scot.) (noting that the court must
only assess whether the verdict in the case, on the evidence before the jury, could have had
a rational basis, and although questions of the defendant’s guilt arise, it would be beyond the
court’s authority to disrupt rational jury findings).
319 Id. ¶ 1.
320 Id. ¶ 18 (“[T]he content of a tape recorded police interview with the applicant, conducted
on 31 January 1992, in which the applicant had made certain admissions, including that he
had been in the deceased’s flat and stolen his video recorder on the Friday night. While in
the flat he had pushed the deceased to the ground and kicked him once.”).
321 Id. ¶ 14 (“It is noted that all four witnesses consistently stated that the day in question was
the Friday. This evidence is of course very relevant to the Crown’s suggestion that the appli-
cant had carried out the robbery of the video recorder on the Saturday night, at the same time
as the murder of the deceased, as opposed to the Friday night.” (quoting SCOTTISH CRIMINAL
CASES REVIEW COMM’N, STATEMENT OF REASONS, ¶ 108)).
322 Id. ¶ 12 (“The Crown was to argue that the theft and the serious assault on the deceased
had been carried out in the course of one incident; hence the applicant was responsible for
both. . . . The Crown’s position was that the McSherrys and the Scotts had been mistaken as
to the day of the week on which . . . the stolen articles had been taken.”).
2013] INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 1195
One witness who did not testify at trial but who had been interviewed by the
defense was Joyce McMillan, who would have testified to the deceased’s “appre-
hensions regarding his own safety and the integrity of his flat, apparently based upon
the behaviour of youths in the area,”323 who apparently visited the house to eat their
takeout food and get money from the deceased.324 About three weeks before the
death, these youths had apparently assaulted her and the deceased in his flat.325 Neither
the prosecutor nor the defense had listed her as a potential witness at trial and she
had not been called by either.326 Unfortunately, McMillan was an alcoholic who was
deemed unreliable at the time of trial, and who died prior to the court’s later hearing,
at the age of 39.327
According to the SCCRC’s referral, the defendant’s insistence of his innocence
combined with McMillan’s information led them to reexamine four additional wit-
nesses, all of whom insisted they had received the stolen goods on Friday.328 The
SCCRC also found no confirmation for the Crown’s assertion that blood found on
a video recorder, which could have come from the deceased, meant that the death
had occurred with the robbery.329 Thus, the reason for the referral, as quoted by the
court, was the SCCRC’s view that “in light of the information available, some of
which was not heard at the trial, that there is a reasonable doubt as to the applicant’s
guilt.”330 With respect to why Joyce McMillan was not called as a witness, the SCCRC
accepted that, at the time of trial, the position of the Crown and defense counsel that
she was not credible was “not unreasonable,” due to certain inconsistencies in her
statements, but the SCCRC believed that “there are clearly aspects of her evidence
which are capable of being believed.”331 Finally, the defendant’s confession to the
robbery alone, which had not been in evidence at trial, indicated that he had stolen
the deceased’s video recorder on Friday night and had pushed and kicked him.332 It
was on the basis of his confession that he was charged, the police and crown be-
lieving at the time that the deceased was killed on Friday.333 Despite their acceptance
of the confession, when it became apparent later that the deceased had been alive on
323 Id. ¶ 13.
324 Id.
325 Id. ¶ 15.
326 Id. ¶ 13.
327 Id.
328 Id. ¶ 14.
329 Id.
330 Id. ¶ 17 (quoting SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 321, ¶ 125).
331 Id. (arguing that “had the evidence of Ms. McMillan been explored further (sic) at trial,
the jury might not have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant stole the
property on the Saturday night and in the course of this crime, assaulted and murdered the
deceased” (citing SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 321, ¶ 140–42)).
332 Id. ¶ 18.
333 Id.
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Saturday, the Crown disavowed the confession upon which they had earlier been
willing to rely.334 According to the SCCRC, the confession “suggests a scenario for
the applicant’s involvement in this case, which is more consistent with the evidence
in the case, than the scenario put forward by the Crown.”335
The Court held that it would only quash the conviction if it could find that there
was no rational basis for rejecting the Crown’s evidence.336 That finding could not be
made in this case. The defendant had the recorder, a plastic bag with blood smeared
on it, and a camera case with blood.337 It was clear the four witnesses had been
drinking heavily on the weekend in question.338 That was sufficient basis to uphold
the jury’s acceptance of the prosecution’s case.339
As to Joyce McMillan, the Court held that there was no reasonable explanation
for why she had not been called at trial except for the reasonable tactical decisions
of both sides not to call her.340 Thus, that evidence could not be considered by the
appellate court.341 The same analysis applied to the tape of the defendant’s inter-
view.342 In concluding, the court made clear that it simply did not have the power
334 Id.
335 Id. (quoting SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 321, ¶ 150).
336 Id. ¶ 35. The court’s strictness reflects the initial disdain that the Sutherland Committee
showed towards the English Appeal Court’s willingness to overturn a verdict on the basis of
a “lurking doubt” or “gut feeling.” See CRIMINAL APPEALS AND ALLEGED MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND
AND THE LORD ADVOCATE ¶ 2.66, 2.70 (1996). In this regard, the Sutherland Committee ob-
served, the issue of overturning an unreasonable verdict must been taken with extreme cau-
tion as it “strikes at the heart of the role of the jury in Scottish criminal procedure.” Id.; see
also Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997, § 17.
337 Harper, HCJAC 23 [25].
338 Id. ¶ 35.
339 Id.
340 Id. ¶ 36 (“[H]aving regard to the provisions of section 106(3A), it is necessary to con-
sider whether a ‘reasonable explanation,’ within the meaning of that provision, exists as to
why [the evidence] was not so heard [before].”).
341 Id. In rejecting consideration, the court adopted and expressed Lord Sutherland’s ob-
servations in relation to the word “reasonable”:
Plainly the word must have some significance as a qualification of the
explanation. I do not consider that “reasonable” in this context can be
equiparated with “rational”. An explanation that it was decided not to
lead evidence, the existence of which was known to the appellant’s ad-
visers, for tactical reasons, would undoubtedly be perfectly rational but
it would be contrary to the interests of justice to permit the defence to
keep some evidence up its sleeve only to be produced to the appeal
court in the event of the verdict of the jury being unfavourable.
Id.
342 Id. ¶ 37.
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under Section 106(3) to reverse a jury decision on the sole basis that the court
considered it “unsatisfactory.”343 Thus, the verdict was not disturbed.344
A case that was referred on the basis of the unreasonableness of the jury’s
verdict presented similar issues for the court. In Ferrie v. H.M. Advocate,345 a murder
case, the deceased had been attacked in a house during a drunken party and had then
been taken through the window out to the yard, where the beating continued and he
was killed.346 The defendant had been identified as one of the people beating him in
the house, but he was not identified as one of the people beating him outside.347
Accordingly, the Commission argued that there was “a lack of evidence sufficiently
substantial to permit the jury to infer that the appellant was involved in the latter
stage of the attack.”348 Nevertheless, the court found sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence to support the verdict.349
F. Two Extremely Notable, but Sui Generis, Cases
Two cases, Cadder v. H.M. Advocate350 and Al Megrahi,351 have played a large
role in the SCCRC’s work. Although these cases have generated tremendous
343 Id. ¶ 33 (“[I]t has never been recognised by the court that some general concern, or un-
ease, in relation to a particular conviction, with no further specification, could be a basis upon
which a conviction could be disturbed.”); see also id. ¶ 38.
344 Id. ¶ 38 (stating that “even if we had been persuaded, like it, that there was a reason-
able doubt as to the applicant’s guilt, it would not have been open to us to substitute our view
for that of the jury, by disturbing the applicant’s conviction”); see also Ferrie v. H.M. Advocate,
[2010] HCJAC 62 (Scot.). In Ferrie, the SCCRC referred the case to the High Court on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient and/or that the verdict was unreasonable. Id. ¶ 2.
The SCCRC argued that the jury’s conclusion that the defendant’s prior participation in an
earlier beating of the deceased meant he was also one of the participants in the charged mur-
der was mere speculation. Id. ¶ 13 (“[T]here was in consequence ‘a lack of evidence suffi-
ciently substantial to permit the jury to infer that the appellant was involved in the latter stage
of the attack.’”). In addressing the unreasonableness of the jury’s verdict, the court rejected
the Commission’s findings and found sufficient support for those inferences reached by the
jury. Id. ¶¶ 24–28 (“It cannot be said that the jury acted irrationally . . . .”). Cf. Hunt v. P. F.
Inverness, [2008] HCJAC 57 [16] (Scot.) (holding that the sheriff’s self-determination that
certain photographic evidence did not undermine the witness’s credibility was reasonable
even though the jury’s right of consideration had been obviated by the Crown’s initial failure
to disclose).
345 [2010] HCJAC 62 (Scot.).
346 Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
347 Id. ¶ 10. The only evidence of Ferrie being outside was a finger print on the window
sill. Id.
348 Id. ¶ 13.
349 Id. ¶¶ 16–28.
350 [2010] UKSC 43.
351 Al Megrahi v. H.M. Advocate, (2002) J.C. 99 (Scot.).
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controversy and required extensive resources, in many ways they are so sui generis
that they reveal little about the everyday work of the Commission in correcting mis-
carriages of justice. Nevertheless, they are important examples of the breadth and
scope of the SCCRC’s discretion under the controlling “miscarriage of justice”
standard. Moreover, both cases have become talking points in the Scottish legal
community352 and have resulted in reforms to the criminal process.353
In Cadder, the defendant was suspected of assault and breach of the peace and
was detained by two police officers and interviewed without the presence of a
solicitor.354 In Scotland, the police are allowed to detain and question a suspect in
the absence of legal counsel for up to six hours prior to arrest.355 The police obtained
inculpatory statements from the defendant that were essential to the Crown’s case
at trial, after which he was convicted.356 On appeal, the U.K. Supreme Court agreed
with the defendant’s claim that the statements were inadmissible because of the
absence of counsel and that their admission resulted in a miscarriage of justice that
warranted quashing the conviction.357 The Court held that the questioning without
the presence of a solicitor violated the European Convention on Human Rights.358
352 See generally Jason Allardyce, Legal Doubt over Megrahi’s Guilt, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.)
Sept. 20, 2009 at 9; Auslan Cramb, New Call for Lockerbie Inquiry as Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed
al-Megrahi Dies, TELEGRAPH, May 20, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/africaandindianocean/libya/9278639/New-call-for-Lockerbie-inquiry-as-Abdelbaset-Ali
-Mohmed-al-Megrahi-dies.html; William Blum, The Bombing of PanAm Flight 103 Case Not
Closed, TRINICENTER.COM (2001), http://www.trinicenter.com/oops/lockerbie.html.
353 See, e.g., infra notes 365–67 and accompanying text (describing changes inspired by
Cadder).
354 Cadder, UKSC 43 [5]. Cadder had been detained under Criminal Procedure (Scotland)
Act, 1995, § 14(1). Id. Cadder was interviewed by two police officers of the Strathclyde Police
at London Road Police Office in Glasgow. Id.
355 See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, § 14.1. Section 14 of the 1995 Act
allows the police to detain and question a person suspected of committing an offence punish-
able by imprisonment. Id. The police were not required to offer access to a solicitor to per-
sons detained under section 14 of the 1995 Act, although detainees were entitled to have the
fact of their detention intimated to a lawyer (and one other person). See Cadder, UKSC 43 [20].
356 Cadder, UKSC 43 [2].
357 Id. ¶ 64. The Criminal Court of Appeal rejected Cadder’s claim that such statements
were inadmissible under Article 6(1) (Right to a Fair Trial) of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). Id. ¶ 14. The court held that there were sufficient safeguards within
Scottish Law to ensure that there was no breach of Article 6(1). Id. ¶ 3 (citing H.M. Advocate
v. McLean, [2009] HCJAC 97 (Scot.)). At the first sift stage, a High Court judge refused
Cadder’s appeal on the basis of the full bench decision, which was later followed by another
refusal by a three judge panel at the second sift stage. Id. ¶ 9.
358 See Cadder, UKSC 43 [3]. The Supreme Court’s decision to review the matter was pro-
voked by another similar case in the United Kingdom that had been settled, Salduz v. Turkey,
49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 421, which appeared to result in a contrary holding to the direction set forth
in McLean v. H.M. Advocate. See id. The Supreme Court wrote:
In Salduz v. Turkey the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of article 6(3)(c)
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Notably, the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility of this important decision
applying retrospectively to completed prosecutions, and although adhering to prin-
ciples of finality,359 deferred to the SCCRC and the Scottish High Court’s decision-
making ability to determine whether some closed cases should be reopened and
reviewed in light of its decision.360 While a proven Cadder violation is not indicative
of the European Convention on Human Rights, in conjunction with ar-
ticle 6(1), because the applicant did not have the benefit of legal assis-
tance while he was in police custody. In McLean the Appeal Court held,
notwithstanding the decision in Salduz, that the fact that legal represen-
tation was not available to the minuter did not of itself constitute a vio-
lation of articles 6(1) and 6(3)(c) read in conjunction. In its opinion the
guarantees otherwise available under the Scottish system were sufficient
to avoid the risk of any unfairness. It approved its decisions in Paton v.
Ritchie and Dickson v. H.M. Advocate (by a court of five judges) that
the Crown’s reliance on admissions made by a detainee while being
interviewed in the absence of a solicitor was not incompatible with the
right to a fair trial. The appellant seeks to challenge the decision in
McLean. He submits that the decision in Salduz requires this court to
hold that there has been a violation of those articles.
Id. (citations omitted).
359 POLICY MEMORANDUM FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (LEGAL ASSISTANCE, DETENTION
AND APPEALS) (SCOTLAND) ACT (2010), [hereinafter POLICY MEMORANDUM], points out that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Cadder has been framed to protect finality and certainty in most
completed cases. See GRAHAM ROSS, SPICE BRIEFING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RESPONSES
TO CADDER V. H.M. ADVOCATE 11 (2011) (quoting POLICY MEMORANDUM, ¶ 36) available at
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S3/SB_11-20.pdf. The
memorandum concludes:
For cases which have not been finally concluded, the 1995 Act makes
provision for time limits in which appeals against conviction must be
made. For example, in solemn cases appellants must note an intention
to appeal against conviction within 2 weeks of the decision and specify
grounds of appeal within a further 8 weeks. However, courts have dis-
cretion to waive these time limits in certain circumstances. There is
currently no test in the 1995 Act for the allowing of such “out of time”
appeals and there is no developed jurisprudence of the court which
makes apparent when such extensions will be granted or refused.
Id.
360 See Cadder, UKSC 43 [62]. The Supreme Court wrote:
I would hold that convictions that have become final because they were
not appealed timeously, and appeals that have been finally disposed of
by the High Court of Justiciary, must be treated as incapable of being
brought under review on the ground that there was a miscarriage of
justice because the accused did not have access to a solicitor while he
was detained prior to the police interview. The Scottish Criminal Cases
Review Commission must make up its own mind, if it is asked to do so,
as to whether it would be in the public interest for those cases to be
referred to the High Court. It will be for the appeal court to decide what
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of the accused’s innocence per se, the court recognized that the statement in depri-
vation of counsel may well indicate that a miscarriage of justice has occurred in the
underlying proceeding—fully warranting the Commission’s intervention.361
Following the decision, the SCCRC received fifty-four applications seeking
Cadder review,362 and as of March 2012, had referred two of those cases to the
court.363 Many pending criminal prosecutions implicating Cadder were voluntarily
withdrawn by the Crown.364
Legislative changes have also been implemented.365 In short, new legislation
provides detained suspects a right to obtain legal advice; extends the six hour period
course it ought to take if a reference were to be made to it on those
grounds by the Commission.
Id.
361 See id. ¶ 67(“Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused against im-
proper compulsion by the authorities thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages
of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of article 6 . . . . The right not to incriminate one-
self, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case
against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or op-
pression in defiance of the will of the accused. In this sense the right is closely linked to the
presumption of innocence contained in article 6(2) of the Convention.” (quoting Saunders
v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, 337 (1997))).
362 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 39, at 12 tbl. 4.
363 To date, neither case has been decided by the High Court. See id. at 13.
364 On February 9, 2011, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service announced that
a total of 867 cases, consisting primarily of summary prosecutions, could not proceed as a
direct result of the Cadder decision. See ROSS, supra note 359, at 8.
365 See, e.g., Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act,
2010 (A.S.P. 15). Notably, the originally drafted Act had contained expressive direction that
the Commission must have regard to finality and certainty in making re-
ferrals to the High Court. It also provide[d] that the court may reject a
reference from the Commission if it considers that it would not be in the
interests of justice for any appeal arising from the reference to proceed.
ROSS, supra note 359, at 12. However, after much debate, and following a division on this
language, it was finally excluded before the Act’s passage. Id. Some critics against the origi-
nal Act expressed concern that the role of the Commission would be substantially changed
if adopted. Id. During the passage of the bill, Christine Grahame, MSP, stated
[t]herefore, the interests of justice can be outweighed by the need for
finality and certainty. Finality for whom? Certainty for whom? In whose
interest? Further to that substantial change to the SCCRC’s remit, sec-
tion 7(4) will introduce for the High Court the power to reject a referral
if it is not in the interests of justice, having regard to “the need for
finality and certainty”—that phrase again. The current position is that
when the SCCRC makes a referral to the High Court, the court must
accept it—it has no discretion in the matter. The approach in section
7(4) is a substantial change. The court of appeal will be able to reject
the referral, even if the case has met the test in section 7(3)(b).
Id.
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during which a suspect can be detained for questioning by the police; provides a
mechanism that can be used (if necessary) to ensure that adequate legal aid arrange-
ments are available for detained suspects; and reinforces the principles of finality as
set out in the Supreme Court’s decision in Cadder.366 Although there was fear that
there would be a floodgate of Cadder claims,367 in light of these changes, the case
and the reaction to it may well be a short-lived phenomenon requiring neither on-
going judicial nor SCCRC attention.
An extremely controversial and very public case that has required massive
resources and SCCRC attention is the case arising from the Lockerbie airplane
bombing, Al Megrahi v. H.M. Advocate.368 Al-Megrahi was convicted of detonating
366 See Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act,
2010 (A.S.P. 15); Cadder v. H.M. Advocate, [2010] UKSC 43 [61] (Scot.).
367 Cadder Provisions “Pull up Drawbridge” on Appeals—Pressure Mounts Against s7,
FIRM (Nov.4,2010), http://www.firmmagazine.com/news/2151/Cadder_provisions_%22pull
_up_the_drawbridge%22_on_appeals_-_pressure_mounts_against_s7.html (quoting Solicitor
Tony Kelly stating “[t]he only rationale I can see is that they are pulling up the drawbridge,
making it more difficult for people to submit applications to the commission and for the commis-
sion to refer cases to the High Court.”); Robbie Marwick, Scottish Government v. Human Rights,
JOURNAL, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.journal-online.co.uk/article/7129-scottish-government-v
-human-rights (“The legislation’s provisions also provoke concern over their impact on the ap-
peal system of the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC).”); see SCCRC Chair
Warns of Risk from Cadder Response, JOURNAL L. SOC’Y SCOT., http://www.journalonline.co
.uk/news/1008973.aspx#.UPmJsyfXZyU.
368 Al Megrahi v. H.M. Advocate, (2002) J.C. 99 (Scot.). The case of Al-Megrahi is known
throughout the world as the “Lockerbie Bombing.” As a result of the public’s interest, the
SCCRC released an extensive news briefing that detailed its summary of findings. See News
Release: Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi, SCOTTISH CRIM. CASES REV. COMMISSION
(June 28, 2007), http://www.sccrc.org.uk/ViewFile.aspx?id=293 [hereinafter News Release]
(“[G]iven the worldwide interest in this case, and the fact that there has been a great deal of
press and media speculation as to the nature of the grounds of review, the Commission has
decided to provide a fuller news release than normal.”). Moreover, the Al Megrahi case has
also influenced a movement towards changing the strict disclosure laws the SCCRC is cur-
rently laboring under. In 2011, however, the Scottish government proposed the Criminal Cases
(Punishment and Review) (Scotland) Bill, 2011 (codified at Criminal Cases (Punishment and
Review) (Scotland) Act, 2012, (A.S.P. 7)), which, among other things, would allow the Com-
mission to “disclose information about cases it has referred to the High Court where the relevant
appeal has subsequently been abandoned.” SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N,
supra note 39, at 2. Jean Couper, SCCRC Chairman noted, however that the passage of
Criminal Cases (Punishment and Review) (Scotland) Bill, 2011 may be “academic” given
the leaking of the Commission’s statement of reasons in Al Megrahi by media sources. Id.
at 3. Speaking to the prospective passage of the Criminal Cases (Punishment and Review)
Bill, which would allow disclosure of information pertaining to cases referred to the High
Court, SCCRC Chairman Couper explained “[i]t was no secret that the Government’s pro-
posals in this area were prompted by the public and media interest in the Commission’s
statement of reasons in the case of Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al-Megrahi who was convicted
of murder following the Lockerbie bombing.” Id. at 2.
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a bomb on a Boeing 747-121 aircraft that crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing
243 passengers and 16 crew members.369 On 31 January 2001, Al-Megrahi was
found guilty370 by a panel of three Scottish judges sitting in a special court at Camp
Zeist in the Netherlands.371 He was sentenced to life in prison, with parole eligibility
after twenty-seven years.372
On September 23, 2003, Al-Megrahi filed an application for review with the
SCCRC,373 alleging that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.374 After conducting
its initial review, the SCCRC undertook a massive, worldwide investigation that
369 Al Megrahi, J.C. 9, ¶ 1.
370 Id. As a result of the bombing, 270 people were killed. Id. The Court wrote: “The
charge narrated that the appellant, having formed a criminal purpose to destroy a civil passen-
ger aircraft and murder the occupants in furtherance of the purposes of Libyan Intelligence
Services, while acting in concert with others, did certain acts.” Id. ¶ 3. Notably, Al-Megrahi’s
co-defendant, Lamin Khalifah Fhimah, was acquitted. Id.
371 Id. ¶ 6. The court wrote:
In this case the trial took place before a court of judges sitting without
a jury (‘the trial court’), constituted under article 5 of the High Court
of Justiciary (Proceedings in the Netherlands) (United Nations) Order
1998 (“the Order in Council”). Article 5(4) provides:
For the purposes of any such trial, the court shall have all the
powers, authorities and jurisdiction which it would have had
if it had been sitting with a jury in Scotland, including power
to determine any question and to make any finding which
would, apart from this article, be required to be determined or
made by a jury, and references in any enactment or other rule
of law to a jury or the verdict or finding of a jury shall be
construed accordingly.
Id.
372 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER
SECTION 194D (4) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (SCOTLAND) ACT 1995, at 9–10 (2007),
available at http://login.heraldscotland.com/SCCRC-Statement-of-Reasons-red.pdf (“At a
hearing at the High Court in Glasgow on 24 November 2003 under the Convention Rights
(Compliance) (Scotland) Act 2001, the punishment part of the applicant’s sentence was set
at 27 years, again backdated to 5 April 1999. On 18 December 2003 the Lord Advocate ap-
pealed against the sentence as being unduly lenient. On 31 May 2004, the applicant lodged
an appeal against the length of the punishment part on the ground that it was excessive.
These appeals remain outstanding.”).
373 See News Release, supra note 368, at 4 (“Between the initial submissions and the addi-
tional submissions received during the course of the review, the Commission identified a
total of 48 principal grounds for consideration and review by the Commission. In addition, as
a result of our own investigations the Commission identified some further potential grounds
of review.”).
374 See Megrahi, J.C. 99 [370]. On March 14, 2002, Al-Megrahi’s appeal to the High Court
was denied. Id. Al-Megrahi’s appeal was largely based on the misdirection of the court, and
although mentioned, little was raised about the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. ¶ 369.
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lasted three years and resulted in a referral to the high court.375 However, that referral
was mooted when he was released by the Scottish government on humanitarian
grounds.376 Later, in 2012, the legal stir surrounding the case was further fueled by
the unauthorized release of the SCCRC’s statement of reasons to refer to the
public.377 In an eight-hundred-plus page report,378 the SCCRC detailed the depth of
its investigation,379 reviewed of the evidence at trial, and explained its reasons for
referring the case.380 Of significance, the Commission had found both that material
findings of fact made by the trial court were simply incompatible with the evidence
presented,381 and that there were questions as to Al-Megrahi’s guilt based upon new
evidence that had not been presented at the time of his trial.382 This included evidence
375 See News Release, supra note 368, at 2. Apparently, as his appeal was ongoing, Al-
Megrahi sought its discontinuance on August 14, 2009, so that he could attempt to be moved
to Libya under the Prisoner Transfer Scheme. See Rebecca Camber & Tim Shipman, Cameron
Dashes Hopes for Relatives of Lockerbie Victims by Rejecting Call for New Inquiry After
Bomber al-Megrahi Dies, MAILONLINE, May 20, 2012, available at http://www.dailymail
.co.uk/news/article-2147110/Lockerbie-bomber-Al-Megrahi-dead-health-rapidly-deteriorates
-Libya.html.
376 Camber & Shipman, supra note 375. On compassionate grounds, the Scottish Govern-
ment released Al-Megrahi on August 20, 2009, given that life expectancy was relatively short
as a result of terminal prostate cancer. Id.
377 See generally SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 372.
378 Id.
379 The total cost of reviewing the case was approximated to be £1,108,536. See News
Release, supra note 368, at 10 (“[T]he Commission’s . . . enquiries were wide-ranging and
took place in the United Kingdom, Malta, Libya and Italy from 2004 onwards. As well as
examining the information provided to it, the Commission interviewed a further 45 witnesses,
including the applicant and his co accused Mr Fhimah. Many of these interviews were
conducted over several days and a number of the witnesses required to be seen on more than
one occasion. Enquiries in Malta and Italy also involved the recovery of official records from
various bodies.”).
380 SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 372; see also News Release,
supra note 368, at 4–5 (“[T]he Commission has identified 6 grounds where it believes that
a miscarriage of justice may have occurred and that it is in the interests of justice to refer the
matter to the court of appeal.”).
381 See News Release, supra note 368, at 8 (“[I]n examining one of the grounds, the Com-
mission formed the view that there is no reasonable basis in the trial court’s judgment for its
conclusion that the purchase of the items from Mary’s House, took place on 7 December
1988. Although it was proved that the applicant was in Malta on several occasions in
December 1988, in terms of the evidence 7 December was the only date on which he would
have had the opportunity to purchase the items. The finding as to the date of purchase was
therefore important to the trial court’s conclusion that the applicant was the purchaser.
Likewise, the trial court’s conclusion that the applicant was the purchaser was important to
the verdict against him.”).
382 Id.
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that undermined eyewitness identification evidence383 and had not been disclosed
to the defense, as well as other evidence that undercut the Crown’s theory relating
to Al-Megrahi’s conduct on certain material dates, which also had not been dis-
closed.384 Consistent with its approach in other cases, the SCCRC’s findings implic-
itly skirt the bounds of “lurking doubt” as to Al-Megrahi’s guilt and focus, instead,
on the issue of prosecutor non-disclosure.
IV. REFLECTIONS AND COMPARISONS
A. Miscarriages of Justice v. Wrongful Convictions
The SCCRC’s focus, and the sole ground on appeal in Scotland, is whether a
criminal conviction represents a “miscarriage of justice” as opposed to a “wrongful
conviction” of an “innocent” person.385 As the cases demonstrate, while this term
includes convictions of the factually innocent, it is intended to encompass much
more, i.e., those convictions that are fundamentally unfair under contemporary
standards. It is also intended to focus analysis or discussion away from the question
of purely factual innocence.
Review of the court’s decisions on SCCRC referred cases shows that the court
has been true to this mandate. The fact that an applicant who has been convicted
may be innocent is not a ground for quashing a conviction. As demonstrated above,386
the courts have refused referrals based on unease with the correctness of a convic-
tion in the absence of new evidence or a new legal claim.
But that is not to say that doubts about the accuracy of a verdict play no part in
the SCCRC’s referral process. As to the first prong of its referral standard—whether
there might be a miscarriage of justice—the SCCRC clearly focuses on the impact
of the new claim or evidence on the jury’s verdict. That is, only a new claim that
might have led to a different verdict will constitute a miscarriage of justice. Clearly
this is more likely to be found when evidence of guilt is weak. Moreover, the SCCRC
383 Id. at 9 (“In the Commission’s view evidence of Mr Gauci’s exposure to this photo-
graph of [Al-Megrahi] in such close proximity to the parade undermines the reliability of his
identification of the applicant at that time and at the trial itself.”).
384 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 372, at 370–72. While this
case has received a disproportionate amount of attention by both the public and the SCCRC,
it does reflect the SCCRC’s general approach, as discussed supra, of identifying a legal issue
that should be reviewed in light of the weakness of the proof at trial and the importance of
the evidence relating to that issue. And, of course, it illustrates the SCCRC’s commitment
to thorough investigation. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
385 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 20, at 10.
386 See supra notes 18–19, 343–44 and accompanying text.
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clearly has referred cases based on its own independent evaluation of the credibility
and reliability of the victim-witness.387
The accuracy of the verdict also plays a part in the second prong of the test—
whether it is in the interests of justice to refer a case. On the one hand, it is the
SCCRC’s position that it is not in the interests of justice to refer a case in which the
defendant is clearly guilty. On the other hand, the fact that a defendant may be
innocent is likely to matter under the second prong of the referral standard. Review
of the cases leaves a clear impression that the potential innocence of the applicant
plays a real role in the discretionary referral of cases. Whether it is in the interest of
justice to refer a case is a subject that is totally within the SCCRC’s discretion and
not the business of the appellate court.
B. Nature of the Cases
In the United States, DNA exoneration cases reveal that factually erroneous
convictions generally result from one of the following unreliable pieces of evidence:
mistaken one-witness identification evidence, junk science, false testimony regard-
ing jailhouse confessions, or coerced confessions.388 Non-disclosure of exculpatory
evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel are procedural failures that have re-
sulted in wrongful convictions.389 Scotland seems to have avoided wrongful convic-
tions on these bases due to several aspects of its criminal process.
387 See supra notes 4, 10, 88, 109, 111 and accompanying text.
388 See Brad Heath, Justice in the Balance, USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2011), available at
http://theadvocate.posterous.com/usa-today-justice-in-the-balance (recording an investigation
of “201 criminal cases across the nation in which federal judges found that prosecutors broke
the rules. The abuses put innocent people in jail, [and] set guilty people free.”); Kevin Johnson,
Wrongful Convictions Shine Spotlight on Judicial System, USA TODAY (May 20, 2012), http://
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-05-20/wrongful-convictions-exonerations/55098856
/1 (according to the first national registry of exonerations compiled by university researchers,
873 faulty convictions in the past twenty-three years have been identified as a result of, among
other things, perjury, faulty eyewitness identification and prosecutorial misconduct); The Causes
of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
(last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (“As the pace of DNA exonerations has grown across the country
in recent years, wrongful convictions have revealed disturbing fissures and trends in our
criminal justice system. . . . In each case where DNA has proven innocence beyond doubt,
an overlapping array of causes has emerged—from mistakes to misconduct to factors of race
and class.”);.
389 Michael Avery, Obstacles to Litigating Civil Claims for Wrongful Conviction: An
Overview, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 439, 440 (2009).
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First, and perhaps most importantly, in Scotland, a conviction may not be based
on uncorroborated evidence.390 While long controversial,391 and currently targeted 
390 A classic statement of Scotland’s corroboration rule was pronounced by Lord Justice
Clerk Aitchison, who declared:
By the law of Scotland, no person can be convicted of a crime or a statu-
tory offence, except where the Legislature otherwise directs, unless there
is evidence of at least two witnesses implicating the person accused
with the commission of the crime or offence with which he is charged.
. . . .
This rule has proved an invaluable safeguard in the practice of our crim-
inal Courts against unjust conviction, and it is a rule from which the
Courts ought not to sanction any departure.
Morton v. H.M. Advocate, (1938) J.C. 50, 50, 55 (Scot.). Notably, the prosecution’s failure
to fulfill the corroboration requirement at trial will allow the defendant to contest the con-
viction, and levy a successful plea of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution’s evi-
dence. See SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER ON SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE AND THE
MOOROV DOCTRINE, 10 n.22 (2010), available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/download
_file/view/596/ (“In considering a plea of no case to answer, the court will consider only
whether there would be corroboration of every crucial fact if the jury were to accept the
evidence; provided that there is evidence which, if accepted, would be capable of providing
corroboration, the submission will fail.” (citing Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c.
48, § 97 (solemn procedure); Id. § 160 (summary procedure))).
391 Addressing this controversy, Elish Angiolini, the Lord Advocate, spoke at a conference
organized by Rape Crisis Scotland on March 4, 2008 stating:
Any attempt to remove the requirement for corroboration in Scotland
would be extremely controversial and rightly so—the requirement is one
which may be regarded as a substantial challenge for the prosecutor but
is equally regarded as an important safeguard for the accused, ensuring
that where convictions are achieved they are secure and resilient to chal-
lenge. It is not for the Lord Advocate to decide on whether the require-
ment for corroboration should be retained but if we are serious about
reforming the law in this area, the question is at the heart of that debate
and is one which we cannot avoid—if we are to retain the requirement
we must be certain that it continues to serve an important function in
our legal system and that the Parliament and the community of Scotland
are willing to accept that it will inevitably continue to limit significantly
the number of cases which can be considered for prosecution and lead
to a conviction.
Hector L. MacQueen & Scott Wortley, (760) The Lord Advocate and the Law of Rape,
SCOTS L. NEWS (Feb. 18, 2008), http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/sln/blogentry.aspx?blogentryref
=6709; see also Amanda MacMillan, Controversial ‘Corroboration Rule’ Escapes Scots Law
Review, DEADLINE (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.deadlinenews.co.uk/2011/10/03/controversial
-corroboration-rule-escapes-scots-law-review/ (discussing Lord Carloway’s review of the
Scottish legal system, and the tensions that the requirement rule has aroused amongst the Scot-
tish legal community, as some have considered the rule to be a necessary safeguard in Scottish
Law, while others have rebuked the rule as it frustrates the Crown’s ability to prosecute certain
crimes); Ross Reid, Rape Charity Welcomes Corroboration Proposal, HOLYROOD (Nov. 28,
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by the government for repeal,392 Scotland continues to adhere to this requirement.
As long as the corroboration requirement remains, it is extremely unlikely that a
defendant would be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of a single identifica-
tion witness, as has happened in the United States, or, for that matter, on the uncor-
roborated testimony of a jailhouse snitch. In fact, charges may not be brought by a
Scottish prosecutor if there is inadequate corroboration of the elements of any crime.393
Second, the prosecutors in Scotland do not have the kind of unlimited discretion
to make deals with witnesses that U.S. prosecutors enjoy and that can provide in-
centives to testify falsely.394 That is, jailhouse snitches, co-defendants, and other
informers are not offered the kind of extensive benefits in exchange for testimony
that could, and often do, lead to unreliable testimony under the U.S. broad-discretion
regime. The same limited discretion exists with respect to plea bargaining. In Scotland,
sentence bargaining does not exist. Sentencing is left entirely to the sentencing judge
who is, in turn, bound by statutory ranges and discounts that may be offered and
imposed in exchange for a guilty plea.395 While so-called “charge bargaining” does
2011), http://www.holyrood.com/articles/2011/11/28/rape-charity-welcomes-corroboration
-proposal/. The Reid article discussed Lord Carloway’s controversial recommendation to
abolish corroboration rule in criminal prosecutions. Reid, supra. In response, Sandy Brindley,
national coordinator of Rape Crisis Scotland, was quoted as saying, “[w]e welcome the pro-
posal from Lord Carloway to remove the requirement for corroboration. This requirement
has a particular impact on sexual offences, which often take place in private.” Id. See also Gareth
Rose, Radical Overhaul of Scots Law Could Spell End for Corroboration, SCOTSMAN.COM
(July 3, 2012), http://www.scotsman.com/news/scottish-news/top-stories/radical-overhaul-of
-scots-law-could-spell-end-for-corroboration-1-2389426 (describing that the Lord Carloway’s
review of the Scottish system, and “[s]ome of his proposals, such as the removal of the require-
ment for corroboration, are monumental and will overhaul many years of legal practice”).
392 The Scottish government has announced a bill (the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill 2012)
that would abolish the corroboration requirement. See Criminal Justice Programme for Gov-
ernment 2012–13, SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, http://www.scotland.gov.UK/About/Performance
/programme-for-government/2012-13/criminal-Justice-Bill (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
393 See CROWN OFFICE AND PROCURATOR FISCAL SERVICE, PROSECUTION CODE (2001),
available at http://www.copfs.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Publications/Resource/Doc/13423
/0000034.pdf.
394 According to the Innocence Project, “[i]n more than 15% of wrongful conviction cases
overturned through DNA testing, an informant testified against the defendant at the original
trial. Often, statements from people with incentives to testify—particularly incentives that
are not disclosed to the jury—are the central evidence in convicting an innocent person.”
Informants, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Snitches
-Informants.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2013); see also Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coach-
ing by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 849–50 (2002) (“Many professional partici-
pants in federal criminal practice believe that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, particularly
by their ability to confer unprecedented and enormous rewards on cooperators who provide
law enforcement with ‘substantial assistance,’ create a powerful incentive for cooperators
to exaggerate and falsify information.”).
395 See Fiona Leverick, Plea and Confession Bargaining in Scotland, 10 ELECTRONIC J.
COMP. L. 1 (2006), available at http://www.ejcl.org/103/art103-8.pdf.
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exist, the prosecutor still has limited ability to provide the kind of incentive that
would lead to false testimony.396
Third, prosecutors in general are much less adversarial and partisan than they
are in the United States. As in England, the legal profession is divided into lawyers
who work out of court (solicitors) and lawyers with rights of audience in court (in
the U.K., barristers; in Scotland, advocates).397 Advocates, being the only attorneys
with rights of audience in the court, tend to have had experience in civil and crimi-
nal matters and, in criminal matters, on both the prosecutorial and defense side.398
The sense of individual role is not tied to one side or the other institutionally. In fact,
the simple division between solicitor and advocate, with the solicitor being the ad-
vocate’s client,399 allows advocates in criminal cases to distance themselves some-
what from the individual client or victim. Additionally, Scotland is a small country
with a small legal community. As in England, professional, reputational, and ethical
standards are likely to discourage partisan short cuts.400
Fourth, prosecutors have and comply with broad disclosure obligations—both
formal and informal—concerning both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence that
currently result in greater disclosure to the defense than in the United States. As to
inculpatory evidence, for example, and unlike in the United States, the defense in
Scotland generally has the right to precognose (depose) any of the prosecution wit-
nesses pretrial.401 As to exculpatory evidence, about five years ago, the law was
396 Id. at 14, 16.
397 Harry Cohen, The Divided Legal Profession in England And Wales—Can Barristers
and Solicitors Ever Be Fused?, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 7 (1987).
398 See generally id.; Barrister: Job Description, PROSPECTS (Oct. 2010), http://www
.prospects.ac.uk/barrister_job_description.htm.
399 See Cohen, supra note 397, at 7.
400 For a comprehensive study, see Griffin, supra note 3, at 107 (observing that “[t]he
U.K. criminal justice process is considerably less adversarial than that in the United States
and thus much more tolerant of the fairness of do-overs. There is greater discovery, barristers
switch from prosecution to defense, and the right to silence is more restricted” (footnotes
omitted). In this comparative study, I also observed that “prosecutorial agreement to receive
new evidence on appeal or a prosecutorial concession that the conviction could not be
sustained” was far more prevalent than in the United States. Id. at 151. Notably, as discussed
in the cases above, prosecutors in Scotland have demonstrated the same willingness to
concede on appeal or abandon tainted prosecutions—as seen in its recent addressing of
Cadder violations. See Crown Publishes Results of Cadder Review, J. L. SOC’Y SCOT. (Feb.
9, 2011), http://www.journalonline.co.uk/News/1009326.aspx (stating that the Procurator
Fiscal Service abandoned a total of 867 cases as a direct result of the Cadder decision).
401 See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, §§ 66(7), 67. The defense also
receives copy lists of witnesses and productions to help achieve this investigatory right. See
id. § 67(1) (providing that “the list of witnesses shall consist of the names of the witnesses
together with an address at which they can be contacted for the purposes of precognition”).
Heeding to the progression of this right, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry expressed in McDonald
v. H.M. Advocate,
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amended to require the police to complete schedules of exculpatory material that
were to be sent to the prosecutors and that broadened the categories of items to be
disclosed.402 This is quite like the disclosure regime in the United Kingdom.403 Many
of the disclosure cases that were referred by the SCCRC were historic cases, in
which the failure to disclose was more likely to have occurred under the past, much
narrower disclosure regime.404
Another feature of Scottish law that may prevent some erroneous convictions
is the fact that, in addition to verdicts of guilty or not guilty, a jury may return a
verdict of “not proven.”405 Where it is a permissible verdict, however, the court may
Under the Scottish system, the defence has the valuable right to precog-
nosce witnesses . . . . But the law imposes a duty on the Crown to
disclose all the statements of these witnesses precisely because, in the
nature of things, they may well contain information which even careful
precognoscing by the defence would not uncover and which might
materially weaken the Crown case or support the defence case.
McDonald v. H.M. Advocate, [2008] UKPC 46 [57] (Scot.).
402 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 13), §§ 117–20. In short,
this provision of the Act mandates that the police provide information relevant to the prose-
cution of the accused to the Crown. Id. § 117(2) (“As soon as practicable after the appearance,
the investigating agency must provide the prosecutor with details of all the information that
may be relevant to the case for or against the accused that the agency is aware of that was
obtained (whether by the agency or otherwise) in the course of investigating the matter to
which the appearance relates.”). Likewise, the duty to disclose information gathered by police
continues during all relevant periods of prosecution. See id. § 118.
403 Susan S. Kuo & C.W. Taylor, In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois
Disclosure, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 695 (2007).
404 Recent court decisions leading to the progression of disclosure law in Scotland and the
enactment of the Criminal Justice and Licensing Act are illuminative of the significant strides
taken from ancient discovery practices in Scotland directing the disclosure of evidence be-
tween the Crown and criminal defendants before trial. See Holland v. H.M. Advocate, (2005)
P.C. 3 (Scot.) (dealing with the disclosure of previous convictions and outstanding charges
in relation to witnesses); Sinclair v. H.M. Advocate, (2005) PC 28 (Scot.) (dealing with the
disclosure of previous statements by a witness); McLeod v. H.M. Advocate (No.2), (1998)
J.C. 67 (Scot.) (dealing with the disclosure of material evidence relevant to the defense).
Indeed, prior to the court’s recent direction in such cases, the Scottish system was observed
to have laboured under “the traditional assumption . . . that, fair notice of the case having
been given, it was for the defence to investigate it and look for exculpatory evidence.” RT
HON LORD COULSFIELD, REVIEW OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF DISCLOSURE: IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS IN SCOTLAND, ¶ 3.4 (2007), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications
/2007/09/11092728/0.
405 SALLY BROADBRIDGE, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, THE “NOT PROVEN” VERDICT
IN SCOTLAND 2 (2009), available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN02710.pdf
(“Scots law is unusual in allowing three possible verdicts in a criminal trial, guilty, not guilty
and not proven. The move towards the current three verdict system began in the 1720s. . . .
The verdict of not proven is essentially one of acquittal. In all respects the verdicts of not guilty
and not proven have exactly the same legal effects.”); Peter Duff, The Scottish Criminal Jury:
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not instruct the jury that they have the power to return it. To return a “not proven” ver-
dict, the jury does not have to reject the law, and nullify, as it would in the United
States, but rather simply applies the law to the facts to determine if the prosecution
has proved its case.406 Presumably, given three explicit alternatives, Scottish juries
probably resolve some close cases—and avoid a wrongful conviction—simply by
returning a “not proven” verdict.407
Another frequent contributor to wrongful convictions—ineffective assistance
of counsel—remains a problem in creating miscarriages of justice. While the SCCRC
referred several cases to the court on that basis, the court has set the bar incredibly
high so that none of the cases referred on this basis succeeded.408 Indeed, in one of
those cases, the court strongly admonished the Commission for referring the case.
The court seems extremely protective of the bar. It may be significant that, as
in the United Kingdom, the bar has been historically and continues to be considered
an elite, highly trained professional guild and is a close, tightly knit professional
community. There is no doubt that the kind of extreme partisanship that exists in the
United States’ adversary system does not exist in Scotland, and that U.S.-style ex-
treme adversarialness certainly lies at the root of some of the wrongful conviction
cases, particularly, for example, the prosecutorial non-disclosure cases here. As in
the U.K., a Scottish advocate’s sense of professional role is much less aggressively
adversarial than that of his or her U.S. counterpart. Moreover, the advocates who
represent the Crown do not tend to be young and inexperienced, as prosecutors
frequently are in the United States.409
A Very Peculiar Institution, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 173–201 (1999) (“[T]he Scottish
criminal jury is of particular interest because it embodies several unique characteristics which
might seem very peculiar to those familiar with other versions of the institution. In particular,
it comprises fifteen persons; its verdicts may be reached on the basis of a bare eight-seven
majority; and it has a choice between three different verdicts—guilty, not guilty, and not
proven—which even many Scots regard as illogical and unprincipled.”). In 1964, Lord
Justice General Clyde stated that “for upwards of 200 years a not proven verdict has been
available and no convincing argument has been advanced to justify its elimination from our
law.” BROADBRIDGE, supra, at 2.
406 See James Joseph Duane, Jury Nullification: The Top Secret Constitutional Right, 22
LITIGATION 6 (1996); see Duff, supra note 405, at 193.
407 Jury research supports this conclusion. See L. Hope, et al., A Third Verdict Option:
Exploring the Impact of the Non Proven Verdict on Mock Juror Decision-making, 32 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 241 (2008).
408 See supra notes 274–92 and accompanying text.
409 Interview with Dr. Fiona Leverick, Professor of Law, University of Glasgow School
of Law, March 22, 2012. Robin White, University of Dundee, has observed that in Scotland
“[t]here has . . . always been a cadre of professional, albeit temporary, senior prosecutors . . .
Advocates-Depute have traditionally been members of the Scottish Bar, holding part-time
three-year, appointments from the Lord Advocate, and the office has been seen as a stepping
stone to the Bench.” Memorandum from Robin White, University of Dundee, to The House
of Commons Justice Committee (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament
.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmjust/186/186we29.htm.
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C. The SCCRC and the Court
One of the accusations against the SCCRC, and against the CCRC,410 has been
that it is too deferential to the court.411 While the CCRC must consider whether the
court is likely to quash,412 the SCCRC is governed by the miscarriage of justice
standard, which is the same standard the court will use.413 It will refer if it concludes
that a case “might” be a miscarriage of justice, and the court will quash if it deter-
mines that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. These differences imply that the
two might not agree in all cases, and indeed, in 64% of the cases the SCCRC re-
ferred, the court agreed that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.414 If the SCCRC
were attempting to refer only cases that the court would agree were miscarriages, the
percentage would be much higher.415 Moreover, the SCCRC cannot refer simply
because it finds that a miscarriage of justice might have occurred; a prediction about
how the court would decide a case is only part of the referral test. The SCCRC must
410 Although empowered to act independently, both the CCRC and SCCRC have experi-
enced times of judicial persuasion on how and when to act. See Richard Nobles & David
Schiff, The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Reporting Success?, 64 MODERN L. REV.
280, 292 (2001) (“[I]t is difficult to construct a workable relationship between the Commis-
sion and the Court of Appeal that does not routinely subordinate the former to the latter . . . .”);
R v. Gerald, 1999 CRIM. L. REV. 315. Michael Naughton, senior law lecturer at Bristol Uni-
versity and founder of the Innocence Network UK, has lobbied for reform of the CCRC
stating: “The CCRC was supposed to be the extra safeguard for innocent victims of miscar-
riages of justice that are failed by the court of appeal. . . . The CCRC needs to be independent
of the court of appeal so that it can focus on whether applicants are innocent or guilty as was
intended by the royal commission that recommended it be set up.” Sandra Laville, Criminal
Cases Review Commission Must Be Reformed, Say Campaigners, GUARDIAN, Mar. 27, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/27/criminal-cases-review-commission-reform
-campaign?CMP=twt_fd. According to case statistics, the CCRC rejects 96% of applications
every year for applicants claiming actual innocence. Id.
411 See, e.g., Duff, supra note 18, at 718 (“I would argue that the Scottish Criminal Cases
Review Commission is more independent of the appeal court than some commentators might
suggest. . . . Admittedly, the relationship is ‘asymmetrical’: while the Scottish Commission
is comparatively free to refuse to refer cases which might well succeed before the appeal
court (as demonstrated by Cochrane), on the other hand, it is constrained by the self-referen-
tial world of law and cannot ensure that a referral is successful (as demonstrated by Harper).”
(footnotes omitted)).
412 See Griffin, supra note 3, at 111 (stating that “[t]he CCRC’s mandate is to review the
applications of convicted defendants and to refer cases to the Court of Appeal for review
where there is a ‘real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence would’ . . .
be found unsafe”).
413 Id. at 108.
414 See SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 39, at 20 tbl. 13.
415 Illuminating this point, former member of SCCRC, Peter Duff stated “we—and not the
judiciary—should determine that a conviction would be upheld.” Duff, supra note 18, at 703.
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also find that it is in the interests of justice to refer.416 That standard guarantees the
SCCRC’s independence because the court has nothing to say about that. So, struc-
turally, the two systems are different.
Analytically and impressionistically, too, the cases show a healthy independ-
ence. One sees that the SCCRC has not been afraid to refer cases in which a new
claim of error was valid but where there was a real question about the error’s impact
on the verdict,417 or to refer cases in which there might have been a dispute about the
reliability or significance of new evidence.418 And, although the court has made clear
its unwillingness to quash a conviction based on a claim of deficient performance
by counsel, the SCCRC has repeatedly sent cases raising that issue.419 At least the
court is being kept aware that this is a recurring problem.
CONCLUSION
In a small country, with a small staff, and struck by the Al Megrahi limelight
because of factors beyond its control, the SCCRC is doing a remarkably good job.
Its investigations are thorough, including a personal interview with the applicants
in most cases, and include extensive efforts to find something new in the case that
might warrant referral to the courts. Anecdotally, one is immediately struck by how
seriously they exercise their role as an independent watchdog against miscarriages
of justice. The extensive recitation in most of the decisions on referral about the kind
and amount of new evidence presented to the court by the Commission confirms this.
Judicial treatment of SCCRC referrals is harder to evaluate, largely because the
cases are small in number. Yet, again, the court’s decision in cases that were referred
but dismissed reveals that the SCCRC has referred cases in which reasonable minds
might have and did differ about whether a miscarriage had occurred.
Should the SCCRC’s mandate be changed? As has been argued with respect to
the CCRC, criminal cases review commissions could appropriately be given the
power to refer cases in which, although there is nothing new in the case, the Com-
mission believes that the conviction is factually erroneous.420 Certainly, such a
416 Gerard Sinclair, Miscarriages of Justice, J. L. SOC. SC. (Aug. 15, 2005), http://www
.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/50-8/1002079.aspx.
417 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
418 See supra Part III.A.
419 See supra Part III.A.
420 See Duff, supra note 18, at 720–22 (discussing and expressing the SCCRC’s review
of referrals, the gravity of its attempt to determine each applicant’s guilt or innocence, and
the implicit rationalist model of adjudication of petitions it performed in the hopes of recon-
structing the objective truth of what occurred). Duff explained that at times he “thought it
was possible that the applicant was innocent but, as regards others, [he] had severe doubts
as to their innocence but was not sure enough of their guilt to argue against a referral. In all
such cases, however, [he] was convinced . . . a ‘miscarriage of justice’ [had occurred].” Id.
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conviction would constitute a miscarriage of justice, and, values of finality notwith-
standing, should be quashed. Yet, arguably the most important part of what these
commissions do is investigate. After conviction and appeal, there is no other way
for an applicant to have his claims investigated. The SCCRC takes this investigatory
role seriously. Given their broad investigatory powers and watchdog role, even if
their investigation reveals nothing new or admissible to contest the accuracy of the
verdict, referral may still be appropriate. Perhaps cases like Harper,421 that meet the
“lurking doubt” standard ought to be referred, particularly because, in Scotland,
given its particular criminal justice process and small population, the number of
such cases would be extremely small.
A good argument can be made for amending the statutory disclosure restrictions
constraining the SCCRC. While good reasons exist to limit disclosure of the results
of an investigation that lead to a decision not to refer, it would be helpful to future
applicants and others to know at least what the reasons were for the decision not to
refer. As to the decision to refer, while the court frequently sets forth the reasons
given by the SCCRC for referral, so they are frequently available despite statutory
restrictions, full disclosure of the reasons supporting a decision to refer would seem
to be relatively uncontroversial and would allow the SCCRC’s critics to see more
about the SCCRC’s decision-making process.
at 721. To this end he notes that there “remains the possibility that if the Commission is
sufficiently convinced that an applicant is factually innocent, it is theoretically possible, in
the wake of a first unsuccessful referral, to refer the case back to the appeal court and simply
keep referring the case time after time.” Id. at 722.
421 Harper v. H.M. Advocate, [2005] HCJAC 23 (Scot.).
